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T. Markus Funk, Ph.D*

Cracking Self-Defense’s Intractable
“Difficult Cases”
ABSTRACT
The “ancient right” of self-defense is among the handful of criminal law areas
that has received substantial academic (and increasingly public) attention,
and deservedly so, given the foundational role it plays in criminal justice systems the world over. The current debate about over-policing, violence, and selfdefense has vividly brought to the forefront the challenges inherent in setting
boundaries between the state’s claimed “monopoly on force” and the individual’s right to deploy self-preferential violence against an attacker. But, as this
Article points out, by continuing to overlook the role values and value judgments play in guiding “just” self-defense outcomes, the bedrock analysis providing the starting point for this debate has been undermined. Put another
way, the debate has, in a sense, lacked moral and analytical coherence.
In the wake of George Floyd’s brutal killing, drawing the boundaries of appropriate self-preferential force has assumed a central role as society considers
how the criminal justice system actually operates and where reform is most
needed. This Article seeks to advance that debate by proposing a new, valuecentric method of addressing the toughest self-defense questions that have bedeviled commentators for hundreds of years and across all legal systems. For
example, is self-defense best viewed as a justification or an excuse? Should a
person mistaken about the facts be authorized to use self-defense? What is the
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and Lucia Zedner. Finally, the author is grateful to Hart Publishing for permitting portions of Rethinking Self-Defense: The “Ancient Right’s” Rationale Disentangled (2021) to be adapated and previewed here. Per course, any remaining
errors are the author’s alone.

1

2

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1

relationship between “necessary” defensive force and “imminent threats”? When
should a person be required to retreat from a conflict (or avoid it altogether)?
How should the law treat morally innocent threats? And should deadly force
ever be authorized to defend mere property?
A tremendous amount of scholarly ink has been spilled on the various technical
and instrumental aspects of self-defense, and one cannot really question the
inescapable centrality of value judgments inherent in any adjudication of a
self-defense scenario. Yet, curiously, there has been little scrutiny given to the
core questions of how, when, and why values should influence self-defense outcomes. Rather, values and the related normative judgments have largely operated in the background and, thus, in the shadows.
The approach developed here is tethered to the recognition that justice systems,
when confronted with self-defense claims, must always balance various competing interests (and values). These interests include ensuring procedural justice and the need to shore up the justice system’s legitimacy and
creditworthiness; the need to allow a defender to use defensive force for protection; the role of equal standing between citizens; everyone’s presumptive “right
to life”; the presumptive primacy of the legal process; general and specific deterrence; and the state’s historical claim to a monopoly on force.
To date, the scholarly discussion, legislative debate, and judicial decisionmaking have largely failed to engage with this broader array of competing values in any comprehsnive manner, focusing instead on technical and instrumental interests or, to the extent discussed at all, on only one or two narrow
values (specifically, the rights of the defender versus the rights of the attacker).
As a result, justice systems, and those working within them and impacted by
them, from the outset have been limited in their abilities to persuasively, transparently, and fairly address crucial public perceptions of what amounts to
“just” and “right” self-defense outcomes as well as the emphasis the legal system places (and should place) on state power.
Some prominent self-defense scholars, for example, narrowly focus on one outcome-determinative value when they contend that human life is inviolate except in extreme situations involving fully culpable attackers threatening to kill
their victim. The result is a proposed regime that is at odds with all known selfdefense laws and would refuse a defender the right to use deadly force to prevent violent rape and all other forms of culpably inflicted serious bodily injury
short of death. The other side of the continuum is occupied by commentators
who support “stand-your-ground” and “castle doctrine” laws grounded almost
exclusively on protecting the autonomy of the individual defender at any price.
Supporters of such uncompromising views argue with equal passion for their
respective positions when assessing prominent examples, such as George Zimmerman’s claimed right to self-defense in his deadly encounter with Trayvon
Martin; Texas retiree Joe Horn’s shotgun killing of two men he suspected of
burglarizing his neighbor’s home; and Travis McMichael’s taking of Ahmaud
Arbery’s life while purportedly trying to effect a “citizen’s arrest” for a claimed
trespass on a Georgia construction site. The position taken here is that all such
hard-edged approaches—whether described as “pro-defender” or “pro-attacker”—are fundamentally flawed because they for no good reason elevate one
or two narrow values to the exclusion of all others.
As these in-the-public-consciousness examples demonstrate, the absence of a
truly value-centric self-defense dialogue has resulted in a weak methodology
for meaningfully tackling a critical criminal justice issue in a manner that is
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transparent, democratic, and sustainable. In the face of the various recent—
and often tragic—high-profile incidents such as these referenced above,
thoughtful people within and outside the halls of academia have had occasion
to pause and think more profoundly about self-defense’s underlying rationale.
The present undertaking is designed to fortify this effort.
This Article’s admittedly ambitious aim, then, is to dust off the existing approaches (some of which have been dominating the narrative for centuries),
hold them to the contemporary light, and suggest that there is a better way of
conceiving the doctrine of self-defense, specifically, and the limits on state
power, more generally. Closely examining people’s blend of deeply personal
views on a range of competing values allows us to understand why the same set
of facts may be applauded as justified self-defense in one legal culture or region
of the country, while derided as criminal (or even barbaric) in another. This
open discussion about the central role value judgments play in assessing selfdefense claims, in turn, encourages more democratic and transparent legislative and judicial decisions and commentary.
Put another way, this Article argues that finding solutions to today’s fraught
criminal justice reform debates requires, as a starting point, a common language of values. Such a process promises to yield outcomes with staying power
because they will have been reached not on the basis of hidden normativity and
false dichotomies, but rather through an all-things-considered analysis of values, and the relative weighting of these values, deemed relevant in each challenging self-defense case where rights and interests lock horns.
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I. INTRODUCING THE VALUE-CENTRIC
APPROACH TO SELF-DEFENSE
Identifying the outer boundaries of when a person should be permitted (and, some would contend, even encouraged) to deploy deadly
self-preferential force1 has long been the subject of heated discussion
among legislators, academics, and the public. It is, in fact, among the
handful of criminal law areas that has received substantial academic
(and public) attention. What is more, the current law reform conversations about over-policing, violence, and self-preferential force have
once again brought to the forefront the challenges inherent in setting
boundaries between the state’s claimed monopoly on force and the individual’s right to deploy defensive violence against an attacker. In
the wake of George Floyd’s brutal killing, this topic, for good reason,
has assumed a central role as society considers how the criminal justice system really operates and where reform is most needed.
Unfortunately, the vast bulk of scholarly discussion, legislative
rulemaking, and caselaw concerning self-defense has paid near-singular attention to what can be best described as technical and instru1. Note that the focus here is largely on using self-preferential force to kill the attacker. This limitation was selected because the use of deadly force involves the
irremediable killing of another to save oneself. It, therefore, is the most challenging type of defensive force to justify. If deadly defensive force can be justified in a
particular circumstance, then so too can lesser levels of force. See generally FIONA
LEVERICK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE 4 (2006). This Article will also focus on selfdefense, rather than defense of others—or private defense more generally—because self-preferential force is the most problematic in light of the inherent selfinterest involved when one opts to save one’s own life at the expense of another’s.
That said, much of what is written here will also be generally useful as an analytical lens through which to assess a broader range of defensive force situations,
including those situations in which the quantum of self-preferential force falls
short of deadly. In those situations, similar—though not necessarily overlapping
or identical—value judgments will be implicated.
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mental legal arguments. What has been overlooked is the central role
that bedrock value judgments play in how we all assess self-defense
claims. By ignoring the outcome-determinative impact of values, we
have encouraged undemocratic legislative and judicial decisions,
which, in the absence of a value-explicit dialogue, are necessarily
reached on the basis of hidden normativity (that is, privately held
evaluative standards) as well as false dichotomies (claiming a choice
between two values when in fact others are also at play).
Although this is not the first time someone has said that “values
matter,” those who in the past have sought to tether their self-defense
analyses to what they described as the “values” in the main considered
only one or two values. By way of illustration, consider Fiona Leverick’s narrow focus on the “right to life.”2 She uses this appealing baseline to develop her argument that only those threatening death may
be met with justified deadly force. And so, even attackers culpably
threatening rape or other forms of serious bodily injury short of death
may not be met with deadly defensive force even if that is the only way
to thwart the attack.
Robert Schopp, in sharp contrast, considers the autonomy of the
defender so inviolate that he would sanction deadly force, provided it
is necessary to prevent the theft of property or to ward off a fairly
minor assault.3 In the realm of application, certain legislators and
other commentators in the public square favoring broad authorization
for defensive force advocate for strict “stand-your-ground” and “castle
doctrine” laws. Their justifications, in turn, are laser-focused on protecting the autonomy of the individual person being threatened with
attack. Supporters of such harder-edged views press them when assessing controversial examples, such as George Zimmerman’s claimed
right to self-defense in his deadly encounter with Trayvon Martin;
Texas retiree Joe Horn’s shotgun killing of two men he suspected of
burglarizing his neighbor’s home; and Travis McMichael’s taking of
Ahmaud Arbery’s life while trying to effect a purported “citizen’s arrest” after Arbery allegedly trespassed on a Georgia construction site.
Both the “humanitarian” (roughly, pro-attacker) and “law-and-order” (roughly, pro-defender) perspectives, in short, have their passionate adherents. But the position advanced here is that these polarities
in perspective elevate what ultimately are rather narrow personal
moral preferences to conduct-guiding legal rules for no good reason.
These approaches, it will be argued, should be rejected in favor of a
theory that accords broader consideration of the full range of values
implicated in self-defense scenarios. By so doing, we position ourselves
2. See id. at viii.
3. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS 83–88 (1998).
For a criticism of this approach, see T. Markus Funk, Justifying Justifications, 19
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 631 (1999).
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to significantly improve the transparency of decision-making, reduce
the role of hidden normativity and undiscussed baselines, and facilitate transparent and democratic decision-making leading to more
thoughtful choices among available options.
II. SURVEYING THE VALUE-BASED
MODEL OF SELF-DEFENSE
Explaining the outer limits of the authorization to use self-preferential force has been an evergreen challenge to scholars, as well as to
those legislators, jurists, and others who study their output. But, as I
have detailed elsewhere,4 a broader consideration of the values implicated in self-defense scenarios considerably improves the transparency of decision-making and, relatedly, reduces the role of hidden
normativity. That said, let me at the outset acknowledge the virtual
inevitability that there will be arguments for and against the inclusion of each of the values that follow. While I elsewhere offer a more
full-throated defense for the inclusion of each of these values (and the
exclusion of others), the scope of the present undertaking permits a
thumbnail sketch of the reasoning motivating their inclusion.
As we will discuss, the values examined here are the following: protecting the state’s monopoly on force (value #1); protecting the individual attacker’s (presumptive) right to life (value #2); maintaining the
equal standing between people (value #3); protecting the defender’s
autonomy (value #4); ensuring the primacy of the legal process (value
#5); maintaining the legitimacy of the legal order (value #6); and deterring attackers (value #7). The hoped-for benefit of the value-based
model, however, is not that it in all cases dictates a particular balance
or accommodation between the values. Rather, the model will achieve
its transparency-enhancing objective if it offers a reasonable, defensible starting point for determining what is, in fact, at stake in different
self-defense scenarios. The core question we are assessing, after all, is
whether the present, stale self-defense discussion is enhanced by first,
carefully tracing the landscape of implicated values; second, justifying
why certain values should, under the facts of the case, receive more
weight than others; and third, determining whether the balance of
values can be said to reasonably justify treating the specific conduct
under consideration as justifiable self-defense.
It is also recognized that the seven values discussed here could of
course be organized differently. For example, reducing overall societal
violence (value #1), ensuring the primacy of the legal process (value
4. See, e.g., T. MARKUS FUNK, RETHINKING SELF-DEFENCE: THE ‘ANCIENT RIGHT’S’ RATIONALE DISENTANGLED (2021); T. Markus Funk, Understanding the Role Values
Play (and Should Play) in Self-Defense Law, 58 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331 (2021); T.
Markus Funk, What U.S. Lawmakers Can Learn from Germany’s Value-Explicit
Approach to Self-Defense, 73 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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#5), maintaining the legitimacy of the legal order (value #6), and general deterrence (a component of value #7) could be grouped together
because they tend to reflect broader collective, societal, and humanitarian interests. On the other hand, protection of the attacker’s individual (presumptive) right to life (value #2), maintaining the equal
standing between persons (value #3), protecting the defender’s autonomy (value #4), and specific deterrence (the other component of value
#7) could be grouped together because they tend to safeguard personal
and individual interests. Alternatively, the values could be grouped by
those authorizing defensive force (primarily values #3, #4, and #7) and
those tending to restrict defensive force (primarily values #1, #2, and
#5—value #6’s focus on maintaining the legitimacy of the legal order
tends to function more like a “swing value,” in that normative judgments to a greater extent will impact whether it authorizes or restricts force). That said, for present purposes the view is that, even
though such alternative groupings can be justified, the order selected
here defensibly serves its hypothesis-testing function.
A.

Value #1: Reducing Overall Societal Violence by
Protecting the State’s Collective “Monopoly on
Force”
1.

Why This Value Should Be Included

Reducing overall societal violence, generally, and preventing unjustified attacks on people’s rights, specifically, are the twin goals of
most modern criminal justice systems (though there can certainly be
others, including punishing the deserving and instrumentally protecting the goals valued by the state). In that sense, then, value #1 recognizes the collective objective of seeking to minimize societal violence.
It is assumed that all citizens, including culpable attackers, have a
fundamental right to life. When possible (and appropriate), moreover,
this right to life should be protected. Relatedly, and from a more statist and collectivist perspective, in a modern pluralistic society, the
state is generally—though not universally—thought of as advancing
interpersonal violence reduction through its default monopoly on legitimate force.
The state, however, must also erect guardrails around its right—
and, practically speaking, ability—to prevent actors from exercising
self-preferential force. Indeed, it is entirely reasonable to say that people’s right to life is, and as a practical matter must be, at the outer
periphery conditioned on their conduct. More specifically, engaging in
conduct that renders the person an “unjustified threat” to another limits the state’s interest in fully extending all available legal protection
to the attacker. And this, it will be argued, is even more so when the
person’s conduct is culpable and the threat is serious.
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The approach outlined here treats only serious conduct as justifying the state’s decision to effectively suspend a person’s all-things-being-equal basic right to be free from intrusion into his personal sphere
(such intrusions including, at the extreme end, death and serious bodily injury). That suspension continues unless and until that person no
longer poses such an unjustified threat.
2.

Tension with, or Support for, the Other Values5

Reducing overall violence by protecting the state’s monopoly on legitimate force, as defined here, is an inherently collective value that
recognizes the systemic, societal interest in violence reduction and the
state’s role in achieving this end. In contrast, value #2 (protecting the
individual attacker’s presumptive right to life) is an individual value
focused on protecting the individual and personal right not to be
killed. Because the collective interest of the state reflected in value #1
is omnipresent (in the sense that the modern state will, when able to
do so, want to resolve disputes through its enforcement mechanisms—
an interest also directly reflected by value #5 (ensuring the primacy of
the legal process)), it by necessity tends to function as a decision
ground that, all other things being equal, is antagonistic to the private
use of force. It, more specifically, will most frequently find itself in
direct tension with the more defender-focused values of maintaining
the equal standing between people (value #3) and protecting the autonomy of the defender (value #4).
5. It is conceded that assigning any particular relative weight to competing
interests is inherently a normative judgment rather than a quasi-scientific
determination. The identified values, after all, do not have self-evident weights.
As such, any balancing of values is challenging at the outset. In addition, there
are some jurisprudential challenges implicated when seeking to balance basic
individual human rights (such as the right to life) against more collective
interests (such as reduction in crime). As Zedner puts it:
Typically, conflicting interests are said to be ‘balanced’ as if there were a
self-evident weighting of or priority among them. Yet, rarely are the
particular interests spelt out, priorities made explicit, or the process by
which a weighting is achieved made clear. . . . Although beloved of
constitutional lawyers and political theorists, the experience of criminal
justice is that balancing is a politically dangerous metaphor unless
careful regard is given to what is at stake.
Lucia Zedner, Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from Criminal
Justice, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 507, 510–11 (2005) (footnote omitted); see also Jürgen
Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 381, 430
(Michel Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998), as discussed in Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 572, 573
(2005) (criticizing the balancing of values as a movement away from rendering
judgments based upon what is “right” and “wrong”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 1001–05 (1987) (arguing against a balancing approach). The fact that all balancing efforts are open to
some level of critique is not, however, fatal to our undertaking.
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On the other hand, the collective interests this value represents
tend to find support in value #5 (ensuring the primacy of the legal
process) and value #6 (maintaining the legitimacy of the legal order).
Whether protection of the individual attacker’s presumptive right to
life (value #2) or general and specific deterrence (value #7) are in tension or aligned with this collective state interest will largely depend on
the particular factual scenario (and is particularly subject to normative weighting). After all, one could also reasonably take the position
that the state’s collective interest in violence reduction is not, in fact,
antagonistic to the private use of force. Indeed, one can reasonably
take the position, as the German law does, that the private use of force
in the absence of state protection actually is, through both general and
specific deterrence (value #7), supportive of the state’s collective interest in violence reduction.
3.

Limitations

This value, in contrast to some of the others that follow, is implicated to varying extents in virtually all self-defense cases. The extent
to which this value, as a decision ground, lends weight to either the
principle of protecting the defender or the principle of protecting the
attacker, however, is largely determined by the weight accorded to the
six other values discussed immediately below and on the evaluator’s
perspectives on the moral and functional legitimacy of the state’s
claimed monopoly on force. Those values and perspectives on a sliding
scale moderate the violence-reduction value, providing guidance concerning who should be protected in a conflict-of-rights situation.
B.

Value #2: Protecting the Attacker’s Individual
(Presumptive) Right to Life
1.

Why This Value Should Be Included

Value #1 concerns society’s collective interest in minimizing interpersonal violence by protecting the state’s monopoly on force. Value
#2, in contrast, focuses on the attacker’s individual, personal right to
life. The central (and largely uncontroversial) limitations on self-defense—namely, necessity, imminence, and proportionality—apply to
both culpable and non-culpable attackers. These near-universally recognized restrictions demonstrate that protecting the attacker, even a
culpable one, in fact deserves treatment as an important stand-alone
value. And although few values will generate as much disagreement
as value #2, the very fact that different observers will want to add or
take weight away from this value underscores how important the normative assessment of this value is to self-defense outcomes (and why
the proposed value-centric dialogue aids transparent decisionmaking).
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Tension with, or Support for, the Other Values

The concept of protecting attackers (and, in particular, culpable attackers) is likely to generate disagreement between those who bring
into the debate very different normative judgments about the extent
to which defensive force should be authorized, generally, and to what
extent culpable offenders deserve protection, specifically. Those who
accord more weight to warding off the imputation of unequal standing
between people (value #3), protecting the defender’s autonomy (value
#4), and deterrence (value #7) will be the most skeptical about the inclusion of this value as a stand-alone decision ground. After all, they
will contend, why should the culpable attacker acting outside of the
law’s bounds formally receive state protection? On the other hand,
those who focus more narrowly on reducing overall violence by protecting the state’s monopoly on force (value #1) and ensuring the primacy of the legal process (value #5) will place more weight on this
value when compared to the other more “pro-defender” values.
3.

Limitations

Although we will discuss the value of protecting the defender’s
broad autonomy (value #4), the instant value’s interest in protecting
the attacker’s presumptive right to life is framed in terms of protecting the attacker from death. This asymmetry (the defender’s broader
autonomy interests versus the attacker’s narrower right to life) is intentional. It reflects that this Article is explicitly focused on deadly
self-preferential force.6 Additionally, it is consistent with the position
that culpable attackers are presumptively entitled to less relative protection than moral innocents.
C.

Value #3: Maintaining the Equal Standing Between
People
1.

Why This Value Should Be Included

Though controversial in some circles, recent events have focused a
light on the reality that an ordered society requires an equal concern
and reciprocal respect for rights between and among citizens. To make
this value more tangible, consider why we get irritated when a person
brazenly cuts in line at the grocery store, engages in a highway passing maneuver using the shoulder, or parks in a handicapped spot
purely for the sake of convenience. What makes such conduct upsetting for most is not that the person behaving in such an asocial manner is necessarily causing tangible harm or delay. Rather, such
conduct, when it happens in public, shows that this person has no con6. See supra note 1.
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cern about elevating his or her interests and desires over the rest of us
who are following society’s “rules,” whether written or not.
Building on this foundation, culpable attackers, like criminals and
victimizers more generally, uniquely threaten not only to identifiably
harm their victims, but through their threatened attack, they additionally threaten their victims with a unique wrong by effectively disrespecting the victims’ right to equal standing in the public and
private spheres. This is what is meant when victims of crime say that
they have a profound sense of being violated. It, moreover, is not a
feeling people have when a person acts by accident or inadvertence by,
say, backing into their car, mistakenly taking their identical bicycle,
or not realizing that they are standing in the wrong line at the grocery
store.
Self-preferential force exercised in self-defense therefore allows the
defender to most immediately repel or ward off the impending or
launched attack (thwarting the threatened harm). The defender’s
force, however, also puts the defender in a position to maintain the
equal standing between herself and her attacker by protecting her
personal domain (thwarting the threatened wrong). In this sense,
then, self-defense permits individuals to be sovereign by allowing
them to assert rights, including the right to remain free from unjustified attack, for themselves. Concurrently, self-defense renders them
subject in the sense that they must obey the laws that they, collectively speaking, impose on their fellow humans.
2.

Tension with, or Support for, the Other Values

Warding off the imputation of unequal standing inherent in culpable attacks can be understood as a value ancillary to protecting the
defender’s autonomy (value #4) and also generally aligned with deterrence (value #7). On the other hand, violence reduction (value #1), protection of the attacker (value #2), and ensuring the primacy of the
legal process (value #5) are, all other things being equal, generally antagonistic to this more defender-centric value. Maintaining the legitimacy of the legal order (value #6), moreover, finds itself in an unusual
posture with respect to this value, because cases in which maintenance of equal standing is under- or over-weighted can yield results
potentially threatening to the legal order’s moral legitimacy.
3.

Limitations

This decision ground is necessarily based on thwarting a culpable
attacker’s attempted imposition of unequal standing (because, setting
aside fringe cases, only such a blameworthy attack, that is perceived
as such, can in fact threaten to disrupt the equal standing between the
attacker and defender). As a result, equal standing is not implicated
in the cases involving non-culpable, innocent aggressors. This is so be-
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cause, without a culpable attack (the requisite culpability will typically be intentional but could also be triggered in the case of a reckless
attack), the attacker through his actions does not threaten to disrespect or discount the defender’s right to equal standing. Such an attacker may threaten a harm but is not threatening a wrong.
D.

Value #4: Protecting the Defender’s Autonomy
1.

Why This Value Should Be Included

The value of protecting the defender’s autonomy is understood by
most. It is related to the concept of safeguarding the equal standing
between people.7 An individual’s exercise of autonomous rights (including the rights to self-directed action, to a personal sphere, and to
own property) can be fairly considered instrumentally closely related
to his pursuit of self-fulfillment. The personal sphere, in turn, allows
one to develop one’s personality and to feel truly free. The modern liberal state accords free people equal standing in the public sphere (see
value #3) and, relatedly, strives to ensure that people have a private
domain of nonpublic life in which they are given the opportunity to
exercise their own comprehensive moral doctrines and develop their
own conceptions of the good.
2.

Tension with, or Support for, the Other Values

Protection of the defender’s autonomy is understandably widely
considered the primary function of self-defense. In fact, it is this function that puts the “self” in self-defense. That said, defenders’ interests
in protecting their autonomy are not absolute and must at times yield
to the competing interests of reducing overall societal violence by protecting the state’s monopoly on force (value #1), protecting the attacker’s presumptive right to life (value #2), and ensuring the primacy
of the legal process (value #5). In contrast, maintaining the equal
standing between people (value #3) and deterrence (value #7) tend to
mutually support this value. Maintaining the legitimacy of the legal
order (value #6), on the other hand, can once again be negatively impacted by an under- or over-weighting of the instant value.
3.

Limitations

Protecting equal standing (value #3) is only implicated in the context of culpable attackers. In contrast, protecting the defender’s auton7. In fact, some could argue that the discussion of protecting the autonomy of defenders should be subsumed under the value of safeguarding the equal standing
of citizens (value #3), because individual autonomy may be part and parcel of
equal standing. While that argument has some appeal, the decision made here is
to give them separate treatment because protection of the defender’s autonomy
can be a sufficiently distinct value as to justify such individualized treatment.
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omy (admittedly a bit of a catch-all term that is defined here as
including the defender’s legally protected private sphere, personal
sovereignty, personal domain, and right to noninterference) may be
relevant to both culpable and non-culpable attackers. That said, this
Article will contend that a culpable attacker poses a greater, normatively distinguishable threat to a defender’s autonomy than an innocent one.
E.

Value #5: Ensuring the Primacy of the Legal Process
1.

Why This Value Should Be Included

Due process is the cornerstone of modern, pluralistic legal systems.
And, as noted, self-defense must not become a substitute for the legal
process, lest it undermine the primacy of the legal process. Consistent
with value #1, the system’s interest in due process signals that, in the
type of conflict-of-rights situation created in self-defense scenarios,
the state should, if possible, determine guilt or innocence, administer
punishment, and determine restitution. And even in the case of morally innocent attackers who would not be appropriate for criminal
sanction, or situations where only property rights are at issue, systemic interests lean in favor of letting the courts (in such cases, the
civil courts) resolve disputes and affix blame. Consequently, instances
of the private use of self-preferential force should be carefully
circumscribed.
2.

Tension with, or Support for, the Other Values

This value supports the proposition that, all other things being
equal, societies prefer to have disputes settled in court rather than
through the exercise of self-preferential force. As such, this value is
most closely aligned with protection of the state’s monopoly on force
(value #1), protection of the individual attacker (value #2), and maintenance of the legitimacy of the legal order (value #6). Warding off the
imputation of unequal standing (value #3), protection of the defender
(value #4), and deterrence (value #7) are, all other things being equal,
more likely to be antagonistic to, and therefore in tension with, this
value.
3.

Limitations

This value is only implicated in cases where (1) resort to the legal
process is a realistic possibility and (2) the rights threatened are generally compensable. That is, in those cases where the attacker threatens death or serious bodily injury, resort to the legal process is unable
to prevent or remedy the damage. In such cases, this decision ground
carries far less weight.
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Value #6: Maintaining the Legitimacy of the Legal Order
1.

Why This Value Should Be Included

Perhaps none of the values we have surveyed is as timely in this
era of doubts about the nature and purpose of our criminal justice system than the value of maintaining the legal order’s moral legitimacy
and creditworthiness. After all, a functioning criminal justice system
must receive the respect of a populace that considers it legitimate. A
criminal justice system’s proscriptions and defenses can, sociologically
speaking at least, be fairly described as the formal embodiment of a
set of elementary moral values (usually those of the group dominant
in political authority) in an official edict. These values, in turn, are
reinforced with exceptions (defenses) and an official penal sanction. A
functioning, democratic justice system must, therefore, embody widely
held moral standards of right and wrong. That is, it must reflect—or
at least come close to reflecting—what has elsewhere been termed the
“fully expressed public morality.”8 As procedural justice theory
teaches, a justice system that in this manner enjoys popular support is
able to more effectively draw on the stigmatic effect of conviction to
reinforce basic moral standards while simultaneously encouraging
compliance.
Universal acceptance, of course, is not (and realistically probably
cannot be) the hallmark of effective legislative efforts. But to the extent the community perceives the law as noticeably deviating from its
shared, and publicly recognized, conceptions of bedrock justice, the
law’s moral credibility will be undercut. The result is a diminution of
the law’s legitimacy (in the sense of moral authority) and, derivatively, its ability to effectively fulfill its crime-control and conductguiding functions. Stated differently, when the justice system accepts
laws or enforcement actions that corrosively clash with the fully expressed public morality on basic issues of right and wrong, the entire
justice system may suffer.
Placing these more generalized observations in the self-defense
framework, to maintain the criminal law’s moral authority and corresponding popular legitimacy, the justice system’s range of permissible
defensive force outcomes must not, all other things being equal, dras8. “Public morality,” as used here, refers to the moral and ethical standards enforced in a society, whether through law enforcement, social pressure, or otherwise. See generally Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J.
JURIS. 17, 19 (2000); H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1967); Joseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance, 15 SOC. PROBS. 175 (1967). The
concept that violations of the criminal law reflect successive levels of substantive
and procedural societal condemnation is discussed by, among others, SCHOPP,
supra note 3, at 30–31 (examining the “fully articulated conventional public
morality”).
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tically deviate from the community’s perceptions of just results. For
even though political liberalism may be premised on a plurality of reasonable moral doctrines, there is a limit to what a free democratic regime bound by the majority principle can tolerate.
2.

Tension with, or Support for, the Other Values

Maintaining the legitimacy of the legal order is another value that
can be viewed (and weighted) very differently depending on one’s perspective. Those who tend to place greater significance on the equal
standing between people (value #3), protecting the defender (value
#4), and deterrence (value #7) can be expected to object to outcomes
that they consider too deferential toward collective violence reduction
(value #1), protection of the attacker (value #2), and ensuring the primacy of the legal process (value #5). Of course, the same is true in the
opposite direction. But although disagreement with outcomes is unavoidable, results that threaten to shake people’s fundamental confidence in the moral legitimacy of the legal order are the ones that
implicate value #6.
3.

Limitations

This decision ground is, as noted, only drawn on in the relatively
rare cases where the contemplated outcome is so out of bounds and at
odds with the fully expressed public morality that it threatens to erode
the criminal law’s popular legitimacy. An example of such a rare case
could be if the courts, say, adopted a Schoppian approach and authorized deadly force to defend against a teenager threatening trivial
property interests. Alternatively, the legislature could follow Leverick’s lead by making deadly defensive force legally unavailable even in
cases of serious bodily injury or rape at the hands of a fully culpable
attacker because of a narrow focus on value #2 (protecting the attacker’s right to life). Unlike the other values, then, maintaining the
legitimacy of the legal order is framed in terms of avoiding particular
“extreme” outcomes—that is, avoiding erosion of the justice system’s
popular authority.
G.

Value #7: Deterring (Potential) Attackers
1.

Why This Value Should Be Included

For good reason, systemically deterring crime is generally (though
not universally) considered a central function of the criminal justice
system. When a particular defender uses force to thwart an attack,
she clearly imposes an immediate, and potentially significant, cost on
the attacker that makes wrongdoing riskier. The greater the known
scope of self-defense permitted against attackers, the higher the likelihood that potential (and, in particular, culpable) attackers will be de-
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terred from engaging in the kind of conduct that authorizes defensive
force.
2.

Tension with, or Support for, the Other Values

Successful general deterrence tends to support value #1’s interest
in minimizing violence and protecting the state’s monopoly on force.
And authorizing deadly force to defend against a culpable attack on a
trivial interest might in fact deter attacks (value #7), serve to provide
maximum protection to the defender’s autonomy (value #4), and ward
off the imputation of lesser standing in the case of a culpable attacker
(value #3). But such disproportionate force—and I say this with a recognition that others may not reach the same normative conclusion as
to “disproportion”—also undermines the value of maintaining the primacy of the legal process (value #5), provides almost no protection for
the attacker (value #2), and may yield results deemed unacceptable by
the public so that it harms the legitimacy of the legal order (value #6).
3.

Limitations

This admittedly more controversial decision ground, like safeguarding the equal standing between citizens (value #3), is only implicated when the attacker is culpable. If, on the other hand, the attacker
is not culpable because she, for example, is operating under an honest
and reasonable mistake (that is, she does not know she is threatening
both a wrong and a harm), then the attacker by definition cannot be
deterred by the availability of self-defense. (Of course, if the attacker
is acting recklessly, carelessly, or even negligently, then this analysis
might change.)
H.

The Model’s Flexibility

As we wrap up this survey of potential decision grounds, let me be
clear on one important point (and one that comes up frequently when I
discuss the value-based model of self-defense). The set of values proposed here are not positioned as the only possible appropriate set of
values. Nor is it claimed that there are not some other reasonable
ways of ordering the proffered values. Instead, the claim here is that
the model provides a reasonable and unique analytical point of departure for examining the thorny theoretical and practical issues involved
in the self-defense cases that are the focus of this Article.
And so, if a future observer concludes that I, in setting up the
value-based model, overlooked certain values, inappropriately included others, or confused the hierarchy or weighting between and
among the included values, the observer’s points do not undermine the
present effort. To the contrary, they serve to validate the reason for
constructing the value-based model in the first place, for such un-
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clouded and pellucid disagreements inherently proceed on a valuecentric footing. In short, I am not worried that others may point out
the perceived errors in the proposed approach as long as, to do so, they
concede that a proper and fulsome accounting of implicated values
does, in fact, matter to the self-defense debate. This is a concession
that, to date, has not been made in practice or in theory in any fullthroated manner, so changing the tenor of the discussion in this way
potentially offers a significant step forward.
III. IS SELF-DEFENSE A JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE (OR
NEITHER)? . . . AND WHY THE ANSWER MATTERS
Deconstructed, criminal justice systems punish by inflicting hard
treatment on those who provably failed to abide by certain rules or
commands relating to proscribed conduct.9 Self-defense laws and outcomes that the public broadly rejects as immoral threaten to incrementally erode the justice system’s credibility, undermine compliance
with the law, and reduce cooperation with legal authorities. The result
is that such flawed systems require ever more severe punishment to
make up for decreased self-directed adherence to the law.10 Indeed,
research has consistently demonstrated that “[t]he loss of popular legitimacy for the criminal justice system produces disastrous consequences for the system’s performance. If citizens do not trust the
system, they will not use it.”11
9. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 403–05 (1958).
10. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law,
30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 290, 310–18 (2003).
11. Mark H. Moore, Legitimizing Criminal Justice Policies and Practices, 66 FBI L.
ENF’T BULL. 14, 17 (1997), quoted in Tyler, supra note 10, at 291–97 (discussing
research on procedural justice); see also Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe,
Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 154–55, 160–68 (2012) (discussing legitimacy studies and calling for more empirical work); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff,
The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127,
134–37 (2011), cited in Pamela Foohey, Jevic’s Promise: Procedural Justice in
Chapter 11, 93 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 128, 128 (2018) (canvassing procedural
justice research); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice
and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3–4 (examining research regarding the consequences of
people’s perceptions of procedural justice); John Darley et al., Enacting Justice:
The Interplay of Individual and Institutional Perspectives, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 458, 458–76 (Michael A. Hogg & Joel Cooper eds.,
2003) (examining the concept of a “community sense of justice” and its consequences); DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 3–114 (1991) (analyzing
legitimacy through the lens of social science); Martin L. Hoffman, Moral Internalization: Current Theory and Research, 10 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
85 (1977) (reviewing the research on how and why individuals in society internalize moral norms).
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In broad terms, our criminal justice system, like that of most democratic countries, can be envisioned as operating in stages or phases. As
an initial matter we have institutional condemnation—the criminal
justice system, through the legislature, defines certain conduct as condemnable and worthy of criminal punishment. What follows is a process through which the prosecutor, judge, or jury allocates this
institutional condemnation in a fair and even-handed manner to a
particular defendant.12 To deserve criminal punishment in a modern,
liberal criminal justice system then, a defendant must be both (1) institutionally and (2) procedurally condemned.
Moving from the general to the specific, and starting with institutional condemnation, legislators (and, to a lesser extent, the courts)
are charged with the task of creating offense definitions that designate certain conduct as “criminal.”13 They, in so doing, transform a
broad prohibitory norm (such as “thou shall not kill”) into a specific
offense definition with action (actus reus) and, typically, state-of-mind
(mens rea—the actor is not guilty unless the mind is guilty)14 elements. These offense definitions thus seek to capture the blameworthiness of the overall conduct and package and label it as a type of
criminally punishable harm (such as “first-degree homicide”).
The institutional actors can in this sense be said to represent, reinforce, and maintain what has been described as the “partially expressed public morality.”15 Criminal conduct, after all, is “conduct
which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.”16
The morality contained in the offense definition is therefore described
here as “public,” because, in a functioning justice system, it is shaped
12. It is of course possible to think of, and order, the stages differently, but the classification and ordering outlined here fairly reflect the actual, procedural, and conceptual operation of the criminal law.
13. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Public Defender Elections and Popular Control
over Criminal Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 803, 825 (2010); Paul H. Robinson, Fair
Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 376
(2005).
14. Examples include malice aforethought, knowingly, willfully, recklessly, and
(sometimes) criminally negligently.
15. Schopp has extensively discussed the “conventional morality.” See Robert F.
Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 161, 166 (1995). Schopp’s analysis has, in fact, at some level inspired the
approach detailed here.
16. Hart, supra note 9, at 405; see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing
Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1107 (1998) (explaining that criminal law’s ability to successfully communicate moral condemnation
depends upon the moral credibility it has among citizens); George K. Gardner,
Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV.
176, 193 (1953) (contending that criminal conviction is the true punishment for
moral delinquency).
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by broad public support, typically develops organically over the
years,17 and is designed to represent widely held moral standards of
right, wrong, evil, and good.
By labeling certain conduct “criminal,” then, a functioning and
sound justice system at a bedrock level18 expresses widely accepted
(and thus “conventional”) moral standards within a given society.19
Note, however, that this partially expressed public morality only addresses those (core) aspects of morality that are commonly perceived
as falling within the public jurisdiction and that are, therefore, properly subjects of the criminal law.20
Turning to the issue at hand, justification defenses (including selfdefense) involve actors who violated an offense definition without having a justification for doing so and, as a consequence, are systemically
condemned and blamed. The offense definition, then, merely contains
the partially expressed public morality; it describes a general category
of conduct proscribed at the institutional level (but this, again, only
17. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 148–61 (1972); JAMES C.
CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND THE UNWRITTEN LAW: AN ADDRESS
11–12 (1889); see also Alana Klein, Criminal Law and the Counter-Hegemonic
Potential of Harm Reduction, 38 DALHOUSIE L.J. 447, 462–63 (2015) (using prostitution as an example).
18. Note that this minimalist understanding of what should be criminalized finds
support in, among other places, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. See G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 29 (Dec. 10, 1948);
see also DAVID ORMEROD & KARL LAIRD, SMITH, HOGAN, AND ORMEROD’S CRIMINAL
LAW 8 (15th ed. 2018) (contending that conduct should only be criminalized when
it protects individual autonomy or “those social arrangements necessary to ensure that individuals have the capacity and facilities to exercise their
autonomy”).
19. See generally James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal
Law, 71 MOD. L. REV. 217, 245 (2008); John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility,
23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 157, 169 (2003); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of
the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW 5 (Thomas Morawetz ed., 1991); Hart, supra
note 9, at 404–05.
20. In this sense, the conventional social morality does not overlap completely with
the conventional public morality. The social morality addresses aspects of the
citizens’ social life, such as courtesy to strangers and helpfulness to neighbors
and the elderly, which are not properly the subject of criminal legislation. See
Onder Bakircioglu, The Contours of the Right to Self-Defence: Is the Requirement
of Imminence Merely a Translator for the Concept of Necessity?, 72 J. CRIM. L.
131, 131, 152–53 (2008); Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification
and Necessity as Jury Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2039,
2079–80 (1996); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976). But see Michelle
Madden Dempsey, Public Wrongs and the “Criminal Law’s Business”: When Victims Won’t Share, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ANTHONY DUFF 269–70 (Rowan Cruft et al. eds., 2011) (contending that
the criminal justice system should also seek to redress communal “character
flaws” such as racism, patriarchal violence, structural inequalities, and
homophobia). In any event, a full treatment of whether the criminal law can and
should be employed as an instrument for such aspirational undertakings is beyond the scope of this undertaking.
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tells part of the story). A prosecutor, in the main, must show that a
defendant violated the fully expressed public morality of a liberal society by wronging, or attempting to wrong, another. For starters, the
prosecutor must prove that the defendant’s conduct satisfies the offense definition. She further must refute any claim made by the defense that the defendant’s conduct fell into a subset of generally
proscribed behavior that is exempt from condemnation and punishment because it was justified as, say, self-defense.21
If the fact finder concludes that the conduct occurred under justifying circumstances that created such an exception to the broader proscription contained in the offense definition, then the defendant
cannot be condemned as having violated the fully expressed public
morality.22 An act initially perceived as wrongful from the outsider’s
perspective as violating the partially expressed public morality contained in the offense definition may, therefore, in fact be legally permissible (though not necessarily laudatory) from a more fully
informed, all-things-considered perspective.
An offense description such as “it is illegal to intentionally kill another person” accordingly only represents the partially expressed public morality. “It is illegal to intentionally kill another person, except
when the killing occurs in the course of actual self-defense,” in contrast, represents the fully expressed public morality, for it also contemplates potential justifications that create exceptions to the
prohibitory norm expressed by the offense definition.23
The discussion so far has sought to demonstrate that justified conduct creates an exception to the proscription contained in the offense
definition, and using force in self-defense consequently does not infringe on the attacker’s rights because it does not in a legal sense
wrong him. An excused defendant, in contrast, actually does violate
the offense definition; however, he does so under circumstances that
21. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (defining murder as “unlawful killing”). See generally Boaz
Sangero, Heller’s Self-Defense, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 449, 456–57 (2010); United
States ex rel. Collins v. Blodgett, 513 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (D. Mont. 1981).
22. See also KRISTIAN KÜHL & MARTIN HEGER, STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR § 32,
sidenote 2 (2018); KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 286
(1987) (questioning whether specific exceptions cover all instances in which an
actor’s conduct may be justified). See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 457 (1978). Note that German textbooks, instead of citing to a
page, in the main refer to “Vorbemerkung” or “Randnote”—the former refers to
sections providing “introductory comment” and the latter to the “side-note” or
“margin-note” accompanying the particular section. For the sake of consistency,
the citations to German sources throughout this Article will refer to the
Vorbemerkung or side-note.
23. In this context, consider studies showing the disjunction between public views on
self-defense and existing and proposed statutes. See, e.g., Kathryn C. Oleson &
John M. Darley, Community Perceptions of Allowable Counterforce in Self-Defense and Defense of Property, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 629, 644–45 (1999).
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make punishment inappropriate because the defendant’s conduct cannot be morally attributed to him.24 Stated differently, offense definitions require action plans; excuses, in contrast, function
retrospectively to undermine the required relation between the proscribed conduct and the actor’s pursuit of his action plan with regard
to the offense.25 A conviction and subsequent punishment hence condemn the defendant, one who transgressed the fully expressed public
morality, as an accountable agent by systemic standards and who,
therefore, is morally blameworthy for the wrong he inflicted or intended to inflict.26
This analysis suggests that self-defense can only provide a justification.27 It cannot excuse, for the excused actor, unlike the justified
actor, in fact violated the fully expressed public morality. We would
not, after all, say, “Unlawful killing is wrong except when the killer is
insane.” Rather, we say, “Unlawful killing is wrong, but we will not
criminally condemn and punish actors who were insane when they
killed.”28
Moving from the general to the specific and accepting for present
purposes the assumptions laid out above, individual offense definitions seek to account for these rather abstract prohibitory norms by
providing citizens with more specific behavioral directives.29 By
criminalizing murder, for instance, the legal order expresses the conventional moral standard that unjustified killing is condemnable. A
fully culpable attacker deserving punishment under this understanding of the criminal law is consequently always condemned for having
violated the partially expressed public morality represented by the offense definition because that, after all, is where the inquiry starts.30
(This is not to deny, of course, that many of today’s criminal codes,
perhaps unwisely, are replete with largely regulatory provisions that
24. See generally Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as
Partial Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1045–46
(2011).
25. See generally Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24
PAC. L.J. 1233, 1277 (1993).
26. See generally Grant Lamond, Coercion and the Nature of Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY
35, 52–54 (2001); SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 29; SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE
KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENCE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE 137–41 (1994).
27. See FUNK, supra note 4, at 93–105.
28. While some actors are excused because their incompetency prevents them from
being legally accountable for their actions, others do not apply their capacities to
their selection of an action plan due to reasonably mistaken beliefs that render
them internally, but not externally, justified.
29. See generally Schopp, supra note 25, at 1270.
30. The conventional public morality allows us to delineate those wrongs that are
criminal from the universe of wrongs, e.g., intentional breach of contract is not
criminalized even though it involves the intentional disregard for another’s rights
and equal standing.
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bear what can be characterized as only a faint relation to conduct meriting broader moral condemnation.31)
It is hoped that we now have an adequate (and, hopefully, even a
persuasive) answer to whether self-defense should be categorized as a
justification, an excuse, or something else (and, for that matter,
whether these labels matter). By way of recap, justified conduct is best
conceived of as creating an exception to the proscription contained in
the offense definition (and, therefore, to the fully expressed public morality).32 The excused defendant, in contrast, in fact does violate the
offense definition; however, she does so under circumstances that, in
retrospect, make punishment inappropriate because her conduct cannot be morally attributed to her (that is, she did not pursue a freely
chosen action plan that at some level at least manifested her moral
character).33 In the words of Fletcher: “A justification speaks to the
rightness of the act; an excuse, to whether the actor is accountable for
a concededly wrongful act.”34 The necessity requirement, in turn, distinguishes justified from merely “tolerated” or “excused” conduct,35
with proportionality serving a similar moderating function.36
Despite the argument outlined above, it is readily accepted that
the proposed division between justification, excuse, and necessity has
not been universally accepted. Dsouza’s approach to positioning
blame, for example, draws on what he terms the “hypocrisy-based conception of rationale-based excuses.”37 At the crux of his account is the
belief that excuses are defenses granted to defendants because not
granting them would be hypocritical; society is not in a moral position
to blame a defender for the conduct.38 Dsouza asserts that his approach is both intuitively plausible and “compatible with most familiar accounts of rationale-based excuses.”39
The challenge to this interpretation, however, is that it appears to
largely be based on a populist assessment of social morality—and so,
if a particular society has, say, racist tendencies, a person who as31. See generally Grant Lamond, What Is a Crime?, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 609,
611–12 (2007); Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law,
18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 501–03 (2004).
32. See supra notes 15–25 and accompanying text.
33. See Schopp, supra note 25, at 1275 (discussing the problem of attaching knowledge requirements to justification defenses); JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 274–75 (1970) (categorizing
excuses in terms of compulsion and ignorance).
34. FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 759; see also Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (1984) (distinguishing between the features of justification and excuse).
35. See FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 559.
36. See id. at 559–60.
37. MARK DSOUZA, RATIONALE-BASED DEFENCES IN CRIMINAL LAW 116 (2017).
38. See id. at 111–20.
39. Id. at 113.
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saults another based on the color of his skin would likely be excused
because a conviction under these circumstances would, per Dsouza,
constitute hypocritical blaming. Dsouza’s perspective, moreover, is at
odds with the standard view of excuses (and it is argued Dsouza, for
no particularly convincing reason, takes this unorthodox position that
would change how most observers traditionally view the excuse-versus-justification divide).40
Under the value-based model, then, conviction—and subsequent
punishment—condemns the defendant as an accountable agent who,
by systemic standards, has transgressed the fully expressed public
morality and who is therefore morally blameworthy for the wrong he
inflicted or intended to inflict.41 As Packer, consistent with this approach, put it, punishment “without reference to the actor’s state of
mind . . . is unjust because the actor is subjected to the stigma of a
criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy.”42 Moral
blameworthiness must, therefore, be inherent in criminal punishment
for it to maintain its stigmatic effect. A defendant who is not in any
way morally accountable for his conduct should, thus, be excused and
remain free from criminal liability.43
In addition to being excused on the basis of insanity, a defendant
may also be excused as not blameworthy because his volitional and
reasonable action plan did not accord with the result actually achieved
(even though, depending on the offense definition, it may have formally met the mens rea requirement(s)).44 Consider the case of the
hypothetical Alex, who reasonably concludes that he is being attacked.
Because of this belief, which is both subjectively held and reasonable,
Alex may select an action plan that includes using deadly force in selfdefense. This action plan ultimately proves to be mistaken, however,
because there is in fact no actual attack. The position advanced here is
that a defendant in Alex’s position is not morally accountable for his
actions, even though he violated the fully expressed public morality,
because he did not intend to wrong another by engaging in the act he
40. See generally FUNK, supra note 4, at 82–83.
41. See also SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 29 (explaining that condemnation is warranted
when an actor violates the criminal law as an accountable agent); UNIACKE, supra
note 26, at 137–41 (analyzing the circumstances in which an act is morally
permissible).
42. Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107,
109; see also Michele Boggiani, When Is a Trafficking Victim a Trafficking Victim:
Anti-Prostitution Statutes and Victim Protection, 64 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 915, 951
(2016) (asserting the criminal justice system is misguided when it prosecutes victims of sex trafficking because the individual lacks culpability).
43. See generally ORMEROD & LAIRD, supra note 18, at 7–8; Russell L. Christopher,
Exculpation as Inculpation, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1141, 1146–48 (2017); Kate Harker
& Ellen Wright, The HIV Stigma: Duty or Defence, 4 U. COLL. LONDON J.L. &
JURIS. 55, 70–71 (2015); Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 801 (Md. 1993).
44. See generally infra section III.B (discussing mistakes).
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was charged with (stated differently, he did not intentionally and
without justification kill another).
As articulated here, then, offense definitions require action plans,
whereas excuses function retrospectively to undermine the required
relation between (a) the proscribed conduct and (b) the actor’s pursuit
of his action plan with regard to the offense.45 The defenses of duress
and provocation discussed below reflect this perspective.46 They undermine the required voluntary selection of an action plan that, at
some level at least, reflects a disrespect of the victim’s equal standing
(value #3).
The will of the person acting under duress, for example, is said to
be overborne by the threat to the point where most reasonable people
would have acted in the same way, whereas the person who was provoked lost self-control under extreme circumstances.47 In neither case
does the action compel an adverse judgment about the actor, for the
actor was not acting in accordance with a freely selected action plan
manifesting his moral character. Rather, he was acting as the result of
an external threat, or a loss of self-control, which permits us to say
that his conduct was, legally speaking, morally involuntary—though,
depending on the circumstances, perhaps still subject to a lower level
of criminal sanction if he, for example, acted negligently or
recklessly.48
At this point, another similar hypothetical may be useful. Assume
Victor honestly and reasonably believes Andrew is about to kill him
because Andrew is pointing an object that looks like a gun in Victor’s
direction. Because of this belief, Victor selects an action plan that includes using defensive force against Andrew to fend off the perceived
threat. While Victor’s belief in Andrew’s attack may be reasonable,
Andrew is in fact not attacking Victor. Rather, Andrew is merely hold45. See generally DENNIS J. BAKER, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 56 (4th ed. 2015);
Schopp, supra note 25, at 1320–21.
46. See discussion infra section IV.A.
47. See discussion infra section IV.A.; see also JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW
643–59 (8th ed. 2018) (discussing the defense of duress in depth); Eric Colvin,
Ordinary and Reasonable People: The Design of Objective Tests of Criminal Responsibility, 27 MONASH U. L. REV. 197, 210–16 (2001) (comparing the defenses of
provocation and duress).
48. See infra text accompanying notes 84–85; see also Colton Fehr, (Re-)Constitutionalizing Duress and Necessity, 42 QUEEN’S L.J. 99, 103 (2017) (disagreeing that an
actor who acts disproportionately in response to a perceived threat should be subject to criminal sanction); Arnold N. Enker, In Support of the Distinction Between
Justification and Excuse, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 273, 283–84 (2009) (discussing
whether the defenses of necessity and duress function as excuses or justifications); Ian Howard Dennis, On Necessity as a Defence to Crime: Possibilities,
Problems and the Limits of Justification and Excuse, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 29, 41
(2009) (arguing that an actor whose reaction is disproportionate to the perceived
harm should not escape all culpability); cf. Birju Kotecha, Necessity as a Defence
to Murder: An Anglo-Canadian Perspective, 78 J. CRIM. L. 341, 357 (2014).
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ing a cellular phone that in the dark vaguely resembles a handgun. An
actor, such as Victor, who acts under a reasonable, but ultimately mistaken, action plan is not properly subject to condemnation because,
though he is competent, his reasonable error resulted in his selection
of an action plan that did not include wronging another.49 Victor acted
as the result of a reasonable mistake and, therefore, did not select an
action plan on the basis of all the objectively relevant information.
Victor’s objectively mistaken action consequently cannot be subjectively attributed to him.50 To the extent Victor took the action for an
objectively bad reason (such as racism, homophobia, or some other legally and morally unacceptable motivation), self-defense would be
unavailable.
A.

Why Accurate Labeling Matters

The careful reader will have already recognized that a foundational position staked out here is that how we formally characterize
conduct is significant. As relevant here, not only is the justification of
self-defense less susceptible to abuse (via false claims concerning the
motivation of the action) than is an excuse, but fair labeling in fact
compels separate treatment.51 People, after all, are entitled to have
the courts label their defensive conduct as accurately as possible.
Those labels, as shown immediately above, necessarily include a normative, and potentially stigmatizing, element. And while, as noted,
claims of justification focus primarily on the act itself, excuses focus on
the actor (and, more to the point, on the actor’s motivation for acting).
Society at large, like criminal justice professionals,52 intuitively
judges a person based on how the courts classify that person’s conduct.53 And so it is posited here that saying “I did it out of self-defense” carries less of a stigma than saying “I killed him, but I was
49. See infra section III.B.
50. Fletcher distinguishes “objective attribution” (did the actor cause the violation?)
from “subjective attribution” (is the actor accountable for the violation?). See
FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 492–504.
51. See generally Kotecha, supra note 48, at 352; Beatrice Krebs, Justification and
Excuse in Article 31(1) of the Rome Statute, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.
382, 385 (2013); Glanville Williams, Convictions and Fair Labelling, 42 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 85 (1983).
52. See Chalmers & Leverick, supra note 19, at 234, noted in John L. Anderson,
‘Playing with Fire’: Contemporary Fault Issues in the Enigmatic Crime of Arson,
39 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 950, 952 (2016); see also Winnie Chan & A.P. Simester,
Four Functions of Mens Rea, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 381, 388–93 (2011) (discussing
fair warning).
53. See Claire O. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
621 (1996); see also Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315,
1329–31 (2017) (discussing how reintegrative approaches would reduce the
stigma associated with criminal convictions).
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under duress” or “My conduct was deemed acceptable because it was
ruled to be necessary under the circumstances.”54
Consistent with this perspective, the commonly (and for good reason) held distinction is that self-defense functions as a justification
that considers the conduct to be, all things considered, morally and
societally acceptable.55 This is so even though the conduct may have
met the offense definition and received condemnation because it met
the elements of the formal offense description, and the actor was mentally fit. Duress and necessity, in contrast, are considered excuses, in
that the conduct, while wrong, was engaged in for a reason rendering
the accused blameless.56 By stating clearly why a person is being punished, as well as why a person is not being punished, the distinction
between justifications and excuses provides the type of moral clarity
that has long (and based on sounds reasons) been the criminal law’s
objective.57 As a result, from the value-based perspective, there is no
compelling reason to deviate from this intuitive and common
distinction.
B.

How To Deal with Mistakes of Fact

Although self-defense is, as discussed, best considered a justification and, therefore, constitutes an exception to the fully expressed
public morality outlined above, additional case-specific limitations to
the justifiable exercise of self-defensive force deserve attention. Specifically, and as detailed below, the defender must be both externally
and internally justified (adopting the “deeds and reasons” view58)
before he can claim a positive right to self-defense. That is to say that
the view endorsed here requires that the facts as they actually exist
54. See generally Michael Patrick Wilt, Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law: Punishing “Good” Lawbreaking in a New Era of Protest, 28 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
43, 49–52 (2017).
55. See also Janine Young Kim, The Rhetoric of Self-Defense, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
261, 266 (2008) (examining the paradigm of self-defense). See generally Finkelstein, supra note 52, at 621–49.
56. See also Michele Estrin Gilman, The Poverty Defense, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 495,
507 (2013) (analyzing coercion defenses); Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the
Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1202 (2004) (criticizing the conventional divide between justification and excuse); HENRY L. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 13–14 (1968), discussed in LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 18 (“Hart
himself refers to justified conduct as ‘something the law does not condemn or
even welcomes.’ ”). See generally discussion infra section IV.A.
57. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Unjustified: The Practical Irrelevance of the Justification/Excuse Distinction, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 91 (2009); George
Mousourakis, Distinguishing Between Justifications and Excuses in the Criminal
Law, 9 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 165, 180 (1998). Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at
1924–27.
58. See generally HERRING, supra note 47, at 688.
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must objectively justify the defendant,59 and she must also know of,
and in fact act because of, these justificatory circumstances (which, of
course, include the facts implicating the seven value-based decision
grounds).
1.

External Justification

Turning first to the requirement of external (or, if you will, factually objective) justification, the criminal law is probably best described
as providing the public with minimum standards of acceptable conduct.60 Justified conduct, therefore, need not be the morally best conduct but rather is conduct that is legal by the appropriate standard.61
By way of recap, the value-based model uses a transparent approach
to endorse the orthodox view that justifications focus on the act,
whereas excuses focus on the actor.62 The value-based model’s fully
expressed public morality, moreover, does not justify mistaken actors,
however reasonable the mistake, because their actions are not considered positively lawful exceptions to offense descriptions. Not only is a
putative defender objectively unjustified, but she also harms the “attacker” by violating her right to life (value #2). That said, the putative
defender does not wrong the attacker (in the sense of creating an unequal standing between the attacker and the defender, in accordance
with value #3) because the defender is acting under a mistaken belief
in the rightness of her conduct.
An actor who honestly believes that he is acting in self-defense, but
actually acts under a mistaken belief regarding the justificatory circumstances, can therefore at best claim that he was internally justified because he subjectively and reasonably believed that his conduct
59. Note that when this Article refers to the “objective facts” establishing that there
was or would be an “actual attack,” it is nearly always dealing at least partly with
supposition based on probabilities or witnesses’ potentially mistaken perceptions
and recollections. This is not an impediment to the analysis, however, because
the fact finder decides what, based on all the evidence, the actual facts were and
whether an actual attack was in fact in progress. The fact finder’s conclusion as
to what occurred or would have occurred therefore takes the place of the conclusion that the fictional omniscient observer would have reached.
60. See generally Bazelon, supra note 19, at 5 (“[T]he criminal code should define only
the minimum conditions of each individual’s responsibility to the other members
of society in order to maximize personal liberty.”).
61. See generally Benjamin B. Sendor, Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of
Criminal Conduct, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 707, 772 (1990).
62. See generally LARRY ALEXANDER ET AL., CRIME AND CULPABILITY 89 (2009), quoted
in Brenner M. Fissell, Federalism and Constitutional Law, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV.
489, 536 n.310 (2017); UNIACKE, supra note 26, at 6, 23; FLETCHER, supra note 22,
at 759; ERIC D’ARCY, HUMAN ACTS 85 (1963); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS
108 (1984); WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND INDICTABLE
MISDEMEANORS 509–10 (2d ed. 1826); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 181–84 (1770).
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was necessary to prevent an immediate attack.63 The putative defender is not externally justified, however, because he in reality was
not being attacked. Thus, value #1 (violence reduction), value #3 (protecting equal standing), and value #4 (protecting the defender’s autonomy) were not implicated.
2.

Internal Justification

As signaled above, individuals may act under circumstances in
which persuasive reasons exist for exempting their conduct from the
fully expressed prohibitory norm even though they are not aware of
these reasons.64 Because of their lack of awareness then, they cannot
be said to have selected their action plans because of these reasons.
Such actors are considered “unknowingly justified” because they lack
internal—that is, subjective—justification.65
Assume that, as Andrew is coming out of a movie one afternoon,
his old nemesis Victor rushes towards him holding an uplifted sabre.
Andrew reasonably believes that Victor is about to attack him and
therefore pulls out his gun. In reality, however, Victor is merely excited about the sabre he just purchased from an antiques store down
the road. Victor, realizing that Andrew is about to shoot him, stabs
Andrew through the heart with his sabre because this is the only way
Victor can protect himself against the mistaken Andrew. In this unfortunate (and also unlikely—but that is what hypotheticals calibrated
at probing the outer boundaries of a situation tend to be) situation,
both Victor and Andrew acted in reasonable apprehension of imminent death or serious bodily harm. Both are, therefore, internally justified. Only Victor, however, was externally justified in acting as he
did; Andrew’s belief, while perhaps entirely reasonable under the circumstances, was mistaken. If internal (subjective) justification alone
was sufficient to justify self-defense, then both Andrew and Victor
would be justified in killing each other. The “incompatibility thesis” or
“paradox of mutual justifications,” discussed below, however, precludes such a result.

63. See generally People v. White, 409 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); People v. Pappas, 383 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); People v. Kelly, 322 N.E.2d 527 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975); Gunn v. State, 365 N.E.2d 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
64. See generally Schopp, supra note 25, at 1284.
65. See generally Thomas Rönnau & Kristian Hohn, Notwehr, in STRAFGESETZBUCH
LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, BAND 3, § 32, sidenote 262 (Gabriele Cirener et al. eds.,
2019); Larry Alexander, Unknowingly Justified Actors and the Attempt/Success
Distinction, 39 TULSA L. REV. 851, 854–57 (2004).
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Why We Should Require Both External and Internal
Justification

The value-based model has concluded that justificatory circumstances only provide exceptions to the fully expressed public morality
if the actor is (a) aware of them and (b) acting because of them. External justification alone, therefore, cannot exempt the actor’s conduct
from criminal condemnation, for an actor must also be internally justified. By requiring external and internal justification, the law prevents
mutually justified attacks that conflict with the above-mentioned incompatibility thesis and that are confronted with the paradox of mutual justifications.66 The paradoxical result that the incompatibility
thesis seeks to ward against is that if each of the actor’s force is justified, then neither actor’s force can be justified, and if neither actor’s
force can be justified, then both actors’ force is justified.67 Indeed, regardless of how reasonable the mistake may have been, I contend that
it will not justify the conduct, because the mistaken actor has no objectively superior social interest or right that would support creating a
special exception to the general prohibitory norm. Self-defense provisions must, as a consequence, be drafted in terms of (1) conduct, (2)
circumstances, (3) results, and (4) knowledge.68 It is hoped that the
reader will agree that this approach is coherent and reflects the normative significance of justifications laid out above.
At the risk of some repetition, the value-based model’s decision
necessarily limits the weight given to the principle of protecting the
defender when the defender lacks subjective perception of the nature
and seriousness of the attack. Assume Victor thinks he is about to be
hit on the head with a harmless toy hammer. In fact, Andrew is about
to hit him on the head with a real iron hammer. Because Victor
thought that he would be subjected to only very minor discomfort, the
value-based model dictates that he would not be justified in using
deadly force to deflect what he believes to be a culpable, but minor,
threat. The fact that the actual threat was in fact much greater than
Victor perceived it to be at the time will not provide him with an afterthe-fact justification, as his subjective assessment of the threat is not
changed by the objective facts. The value-based model’s conception of
self-defense as a justification is, therefore, partially agent-centered,
66. See generally Rönnau & Hohn, supra note 65, at sidenote 113; Reid Griffith Fontaine, An Attack on Self-Defense, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 77–79 (2010); Russell
L. Christopher, Mistake of Fact in the Objective Theory of Justification: Do Two
Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two Rights . . . ?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
295, 319–20 (1994).
67. See Henning Rosenau, Notwehr und Notstand, in 4 STRAFGESETZBUCH: KOMMENTAR, sidenotes 2, 18 (Helmut Satzger & Wilhelm Schluckebier eds., 2019);
Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical Necessity of the
Dadson Principle in Self-Defence, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 229, 242 (1995).
68. See SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 37.
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and partially target-centered. Properly conceived, self-defense, therefore, requires both a particular mental state on the part of the defender, as well as an actual threat of harming or wronging.69
4.

Why We Should Reject the Utilitarian “Legal Justification”

England’s Lord Macaulay was one of the first commentators to expressly examine the issue of unknowing justification. And he reached
a conclusion contrary to the one advanced here. Macaulay, like Robinson, adopted a utilitarian approach, arguing that the defender’s
mental state is largely unimportant; a defensive act that ultimately
benefits society should be encouraged: “[W]hen an act which is really
useful to society, an act of a sort which it is desirable to encourage, has
been done, it is absurd to inquire into the motives of the doer, for the
purpose of punishing him if it shall appear that his motives were
bad.”70 Other commentators, including Simester, have taken an opposing, public policy-based position, contending that unknowingly justified conduct should in fact be discouraged because it results in social
dis-utility “by encouraging the commission of prima-facie offences in
the hope that they might turn out to be fortuitously defensible.”71 Still
others have criticized the requirement that defenders must be aware
of the justifying circumstances on the ground that the principle weakens the legitimacy of the criminal law.72 As noted above, however, un69. Russell Christopher refers to this approach as the “agent-centered subjective approach.” Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Objectivity: A Reply to Judith
Jarvis Thomson, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 565 (1998).
70. 7 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 552 (Hannah Macaulay Trevelyan ed., 1866);
see also Boaz Sangero, A New Defense for Self-Defense, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 475,
499 (2006) (discussing the varying perceptions of justification); MICHAEL S.
MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIMINAL LAW 180–81 (1993) (questioning whether the justification defense
should be available to defendants who are unaware of the justifying circumstances); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Responsibility, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 289–90 (1975) (“One’s
mental state simply cannot convert otherwise harmless conduct into a
crime . . . .”).
71. A.P. Simester, Mistakes in Defence, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 295, 303 (1992);
see also Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 24 LAW & PHIL. 611, 626–36 (2005) (discussing defendants whose actions
are unknowingly justified).
72. See Robinson, supra note 70, at 266; see also SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 35–36 (arguing that the unknowingly justified actor could still be liable for attempt); Andrew Ashworth, Belief, Intent and Criminal Liability, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 1, 28–29 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987) (“[A]lthough the
absence of actual unlawfulness should prevent conviction for the substantive offence, there is a strong prima facie argument that a conviction for attempt should
follow.”).
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knowingly justified actors should not, in fact, be candidates for the
justification of self-defense.73
Having plowed this theoretically compacted ground, we turn next
to the question of why the presence of justificatory facts does not negate the offense definition’s actus reus requirement. The answer to
this question can be found in the distinction between offense and defense definitions. If the offense–defense distinction is applied, the
question of whether a defense is available (that is, whether the defendant’s conduct is an exception to, or a justified infringement of, the
fully expressed public morality) is distinct from the question of
whether the defendant violated the partially expressed public morality represented by the offense definition. Contra the arguments advanced by Professors Williams74 and Robinson,75 the availability of a
defense should be considered independently and has no bearing on
whether the defendant satisfied the offense definition’s actus reus requirement. The defense, then, renders the commission of the prima
facie offense permissible on the basis of accompanying circumstances
not directly contemplated in the definition of the actus reus.76
If the distinction between offenses and defenses is disregarded, on
the other hand, defenses become nothing more than negative definitional elements of the offense.77 The actus reus of an assault, for example, would require both the typical features of an assault and
would require that the assault occur in such circumstances that no
defense pertains. A defendant’s unlawfulness would, therefore, be
treated as a circumstance that is part of the actus reus necessary for
criminal liability.78
My view is that such a conception of utilitarian “legal justifications” is flawed, because viewing unlawfulness as part of the actus
reus puts the proverbial cart before the horse. “Unlawful” merely describes conduct that satisfies both the actus reus and mens rea re73. See generally Rönnau & Hohn, supra note 65, at sidenote 262; FUNK, supra note
4, at 98–103.
74. See GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 23 (1953) (“[T]he
rule seems hard to reconcile with the requirement of an actus reus.”).
75. See Robinson, supra note 70, at 266.
76. See Simester, supra note 71, at 296–302; see also David Lanham, Larsonneur
Revisited, 1976 CRIM. L. REV. 276, 276 (“As a matter of analysis we can think of a
crime as being made up of three ingredients, actus reus, mens rea and (a negative
element) absence of a valid defence.”).
77. Cf. Enker, supra note 48, at 278–79. See generally Rosenau, supra note 67, at
sidenote 4; Rönnau & Hohn, supra note 65, at sidenote 15; Grant Lamond, Core
Principles of English Criminal Law, in THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ANGLOGERMAN CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 26 (Matthew Dyson & Benjamin Vogel eds.,
2018).
78. See generally HERRING, supra note 47, at 684.
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quirements of the offense definition.79 As a matter of logical process,
only after the fact finder determines that the defendant fits the offense definition should the issue of a possible defense become relevant.
This approach, which also finds support among German theorists, appropriately recognizes the basic normative distinction between offenses and defenses that, among other things, allows the public to
better understand proscribed conduct.80
The result is that self-defense, as discussed, can only be legally justified if the actor was both internally and externally justified. Smith
argues that any requirement of internal justification is based on public policy rather than on logic.81 I, for the reasons articulated, disagree. Requiring both internal and external justification represents a
principled, coherent, and logically compelled method of preventing unknowingly justified actors from benefitting from their fortuitous justification while concurrently avoiding the paradox of unknown
justifications. Requiring internal justification is furthermore consistent with the requirement that excuses can only be claimed by actors
to whom the harm cannot be “subjectively attributed” in the sense
that they are not morally accountable for the harm.
C.

Addressing “Unreasonable” Mistakes of Fact

Mistakes of fact in the context of self-defense can be made with
regard to three distinct issues: (a) whether the actor is actually being
attacked, (b) whether the degree of defensive force is necessary to ward
off the attack, and (c) whether the degree of defensive force is grossly
disproportionate to the harm threatened.82 The first two questions are
matters of fact, whereas the third question is ultimately a value judgment that is answered by reference to the fully expressed public morality (though the facts underlying the assessment concededly could of
course also be subject to a mistake of fact). The discussion above has
hopefully demonstrated to most readers that a reasonable mistake of
fact as to the extant circumstances will not justify defensive force but
79. See Albert v. Lavin [1982] AC 150 (HL) 152 (appeal taken from Eng.) (arguing
that in setting forth the elements in criminal offenses the word “unlawful” is
tautologous).
80. See also Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 241 n.164 (1982) (“The distinction between offenses and defenses is perhaps the most basic distinction in criminal law that lawyers . . . recognize.”), quoted in United States v. Ortiz, 927 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir.
2019). See generally Rosenau, supra note 67, at sidenote 4; Gunnar Duttge, Irrtum über Tatumstände, in GESAMTES STRAFRECHT § 16, sidenote 14 (2017); HANSHEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 250 (5th ed. 1996).
81. J.C. SMITH, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 31–32 (1989).
82. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and Bernhard Goetz,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1186 (1989).

34

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1

instead may constitute an excusable infringement of the prohibition,
because external justification is required for conduct to be justified.83
Still unresolved, however, remains the important foundational question of what an “unreasonable” mistake is, and, more importantly,
what impact such a mistake should have on the analysis.
People form unreasonable beliefs in the self-defense context for two
basic reasons: (a) they fail to take sufficient care in evaluating the circumstances that confront them before resorting to defensive force, or
(b) their capacity to evaluate the relevant circumstances is to some
extent impaired.84 The first scenario presents the least analytical difficulty. An actor who simply does not take the proper care in evaluating whether defensive force is necessary can surely (at some level at
least) be morally blamed for his mistake. Because of his carelessness,
such an actor culpably infringes on an innocent victim’s autonomy,
and therefore, he may not claim self-defense. Such an actor was not
externally justified, and he also neither lacked legal competency nor
chose a reasonably mistaken action plan. The defender’s relative lack
of blameworthiness may, nevertheless, be taken into account by the
judge at the sentencing stage as a mitigating circumstance; it may
prevent him from having the necessary mens rea required by a particular offense definition; or, if he was merely negligent, certain categories of criminal punishment may be inappropriate.
The second type of unreasonable mistake is made by an actor
whose capacity to properly evaluate the situation is impaired due either to a psychological disability or because of some other personal
characteristic, such as fearfulness or a bad temper. An unreasonably
mistaken person suffering from a psychological disability preventing
him from properly evaluating the circumstances will be excused because he was legally incompetent at the time of the act. While an insane attacker infringes on the private domain of another and is,
therefore, subject to justified defensive force, he cannot be said to be
legally accountable for his actions or for the harm he threatens.85
On the other hand, per the value-based model, actors who are impaired in their ability to evaluate the relevant circumstances because
of, say, fear, nervousness, or natural aggression—and therefore unreasonably believe they are acting in self-defense—do impermissibly
infringe on the “attacker’s” personal domain without justification or
83. See supra section III.B; see also FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 696–97, 762–69 (asserting that a reasonable mistake as to the presence of justifying conditions prevents justification), noted in Vera Bergelson, Duress Is No Excuse, 15 OH. ST. J.
CRIM. L. 395, 401 n.34 (2018).
84. See generally Benjamin B. Sendor, Crimes as Communication: An Interpretive
Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J.
1371, 1399 n.129 (1986).
85. See generally Daniel Yeager, Decoding the Impossibility Defense, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 359, 362–64 (2018).
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excuse, thereby implicating value #2 and, depending on the circumstances, value #3 (equal standing). In contrast to legal insanity, personality traits, such as fearfulness or aggression, are, broadly
speaking at least, within the person’s control.86
The fictitious “reasonable person,” moreover, should not be endowed with problematic traits, such as timidity or fearfulness, for the
law expects people to control such “flawed” personal characteristics.87
Putting these pieces together, the moral norm inherent in the reasonable person test is that persons who fail to overcome personal characteristics that they can fairly be expected to surmount are blameworthy
and are, therefore, liable for punishment.88
Such actors are not necessarily strongly culpable, in the sense that
they may not have acted with an evil purpose. Depending on the facts,
however, they can be described as “weakly culpable” because of their
failure to control their excessive fearfulness or aggression. The position staked out here is that such weakly culpable actors do not, as a
default position, deserve to be excused or justified. Their conduct, at
some level at least, reflects a disregard for the interests of others and
therefore inflicts a wrong—thus implicating value #3 (equal standing),
value #4 (protecting the defender’s autonomy), and value #7 (deterrence).89 A contrary result would allow actors who are sane, but overly
aggressive or fearful, to unjustly infringe on the private domains of
others. (Note, however, that the actor’s fearfulness or aggression may
of course be a mitigating circumstance.)
D.

The Value-Based Model’s Approach to the “Forfeiture” of
Rights: Introducing the Concept of “Waiver”

Echoing the positions advanced by Uniacke and Thomson, Leverick argues that “[i]t is acceptable to kill an aggressor because the aggressor, in becoming an unjust immediate threat to the life of another
that cannot be avoided by any reasonable means, temporarily forfeits
86. This is in contrast to other factors that are relevant in determining whether a
person acted reasonably, such as the actor’s physical size, ability, and age.
87. See generally Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1, 26–27
(2012); G.L. Mogridge, The Reasonable Man: Negligence and Criminal Capacity,
97 S. AFR. L.J. 267, 270–71 (1980).
88. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 789 (1994) (discussing
George P. Fletcher’s position on the reasonable person standard); George P.
Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269,
1291 (1974).
89. See supra sections II.C–D, G; see also Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 17 (2003) (noting that morally justified
defenses may go unrecognized in the criminal law and justified legal defenses
may include conduct that is not morally justified).
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her right to life, at least as long as these conditions remain in force.”90
Leverick’s quasi-Hohfeldian “claim-right” argument,91 however, is
hampered by the bluntness of the term “forfeiture.” Under the orthodox view, an attacker “forfeits” his rights as a result of his “wrongful”
conduct; this, in turn, implies a form of open-ended punishment or
penalty.92 Dsouza faults forfeiture theory because it, in the self-defense context, “carries with it punitive undertones and suggests some
element of fault on the part of the person suffering the defensive action.”93 Leverick similarly allows that a forfeiture-based account of
self-defensive killing is “likely to be controversial” because “of the
term’s association with fault, penalty, or punishment.”94
The position proposed here seeks to overcome these well-grounded
challenges by replacing the notion of blanket forfeiture with a more
fine-grained approach which distinguishes between (morally) intentional and unintentional actors.95 This approach deploys the forfeiture
versus waiver bifurcation to blunt—and, in fact, perhaps overcome—
the traditional arguments advanced against the concept of forfeiture
of rights.
It is widely recognized that there can be a “conditional forfeiture”
or a “temporary suspension of rights.” These concepts apply to innocent actors who, because they pose unjust threats of harm, forfeit their
rights to non-interference as long as they continue to present an ongoing threat.96 As Simons, discussing Bergelson, puts it, conditional forfeiture is “a special kind of forfeiture, involving a conditional right to
90. LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis added).
91. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
92. See also LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 67 (asserting that the term “forfeiture” is used
in a “non-punitive sense”); Whitley Kaufman, Is There a “Right” to Self-Defense?,
23 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 20, 25–29 (2004) (explaining the concept of forfeiture);
SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 75–76 (“By engaging in a criminal violation of the victim’s sovereignty, the aggressor steps outside of the domain of central, self-regarding life decisions within which he can claim a right to freedom from
interference.”). See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283 (1991).
93. DSOUZA, supra note 37, at 66–67 (footnote omitted); see also HERRING, supra note
47, at 714–15 (discussing the various traditional arguments against forfeiture
theory).
94. LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 67; see sources cited supra note 92.
95. Erb recognizes this distinction in the self-defense context, contending that the
duty of interpersonal solidarity is greater with innocent attackers. See Volker
Erb, Notwehr als Menschenrecht: Zugleich eine Kritik der Entscheidung des LG
Frankfurt am Main im “Fall Daschner,” 25 NSTZ 593, 596 (2005).
96. One way of conceptualizing this is thinking of the waiver or forfeiture as opening
a gap in the attacker’s otherwise inviolable personal domain. This gap remains
open so long as the individual continues to pose such a threat, and because the
availability of self-defense is limited by the value-based model’s decision grounds,
the gap, once created, does not result in unconditional and open-ended forfeiture.
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life, where the actor loses the right if he becomes an unjust immediate
threat.”97
So far, so good—but there is something missing in this analysis.
Building on this concept of forfeiture conditioned on conduct, we here
introduce the concept of “conditional waiver” to describe culpable attackers who knowingly pose a threat of both harming and wronging,
thereby affirmatively waiving their right to non-interference.98 While
Simons contends that self-defense “involves (involuntary) forfeiture,”99 the position advanced here is that knowing and intentional
attackers are, in fact, morally blameworthy.100 The natural consequence of launching a morally blameworthy attack is that the conduct
creates in the defender the right to resort to lawful defensive force,
which, in turn, justifies imputing on the attacker the intent to conditionally waive his right to non-interference.101 And so a culpable attacker assaulting an innocent defender through his conduct
conditionally waives his right to not be met with the full measure of
permissible defensive force (more on this below).
The decision to bifurcate the traditional omnibus term “forfeiture”
also responds to critics such as Kasachkoff. It recognizes the considerable normative asymmetry between those morally innocent attackers
who threaten to merely harm and those morally culpable attackers
who threaten to both harm and wrong. This is also on all fours with
97. Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Victim Conduct in Tort and Criminal Law,
8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 541, 544 n.9 (2005); see also Catherine Elliott, Interpreting
the Contours of Self-Defence Within the Boundaries of the Rule of Law, the Common Law and Human Rights, 79 J. CRIM. L. 330, 339 (2015) (examining proportionality within the forfeiture analysis); Samantha Krause, Killing in Defence of
Property: A Constitutional Approach, 2012 J. S. AFR. L. 469, 477 (discussing the
competing interests between attackers and defenders).
98. The notion that the normative culpability and responsibility of the attacker is
relevant to the defender’s ability to exercise defensive force (and what amount of
defensive force the defender can utilize) finds support in some of the German
scholarship. See, e.g., Heiko Lesch, Die Notwehr, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS DAHS
81, 91 (Gunter Widmaier et al. eds., 2005).
99. Simons, supra note 97, at 544 n.9.
100. Cf. Karen L. Bell, Toward a New Analysis of the Abortion Debate, 33 ARIZ. L. REV.
907, 927 (1991). See generally Benjamin Vogel, The Core Legal Concepts and
Principles Defining Criminal Law in Germany, in THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW:
ANGLO-GERMAN CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 43–44 (Matthew Dyson & Benjamin
Vogel eds., 2018); Robert E. Wagner, Corporate Criminal Prosecutions and the
Exclusionary Rule, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2016).
101. See also Adrienne Rose, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a
Co-Conspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 293–94 (2011) (explaining various
ways a defendant may forfeit his confrontation rights); United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (reviewing instances in which the Supreme
Court held a defendant may waive his right to confrontation by misconduct). See
generally Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (finding an implied
waiver of the right to be present during trial when the defendant absconded).
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the prevailing nomenclature; “forfeiture” in the main refers to the simple loss of a particular right,102 whereas waiver includes conduct-inferred knowing and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.103 When an individual engages in a criminal attack on
another, she knows—or can be imputed to know—that she, through
her conduct, has knowingly and intentionally relinquished her right to
non-interference in her autonomous sphere of self-determination.104
Innocent attackers, in contrast, by definition do not know of the
wrongfulness of their conduct. They, therefore, at worst can be said to
forfeit some of their ability to claim an absolute right to non-interference. After all, defenders cannot be expected to always subjugate their
own substantive interests to those of the attacker—whether innocent
or otherwise.
The instant analysis, in short, endorses, and in fact is grounded
upon, the argument that by becoming what Uniacke has aptly termed
an “unjust threat,”105 the attacker creates a morally distinctive asymmetry between himself and the person whom he is threatening.106 Per
Uniacke, individuals cannot be said to possess unconditional human
rights; rather, they have rights that are conditioned on their behavior
(that is, on their not wronging or harming another).107
Uniacke, in line with philosophers like Grotius and Pufendorf,
however, also maintains that the moral or criminal culpability of the
“unjustified threat” is irrelevant. Grotius similarly described as “inno102. See generally David Alm, Self-Defense, Punishment and Forfeiture, 32 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 91, 99 (2013).
103. See also Louis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth
Amendment Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil
Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1111, 1159 (2017) (discussing that due process
requires a waiver to be “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent”); Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (noting that an effective waiver must be a deliberate relinquishment of the right). See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938).
104. See generally Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20; Rose, supra note 101, at 293–94.
105. It is important to note that this term does not rely on a negative moral judgment
about the attacker, but instead is based entirely on the attacker’s status as
threatening an actual unjustified invasion of the defender’s personal domain.
106. See generally Eamon Aloyo, Just Assassinations, 5 INT’L THEORY 347, 359 (2013);
UNIACKE, supra note 26, at 75–81.
107. UNIACKE, supra note 26, at 195–96; see also Terrance McConnell, The Nature and
Basis of Inalienable Rights, 3 LAW & PHIL. 25, 28 (1984) (“A right that can be
forfeited is . . . conditional: to retain it, the possessor must not behave improperly.”); Hugo Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 MONIST 550, 568 (1968) (“[T]he offender, by violating the life or liberty or property of another, has lost his own
right to have his life, liberty, or property respected . . . .”) (quoting W. DAVID ROSS,
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 60–61 (1930)), discussed in Stuart P. Green, Castles
and Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 20–21. See generally H. L. A. Hart, Are
There Any Natural Rights?, in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 53 (Anthony Quinton ed.,
1967).
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cent” or “unoffending” those who do not create a dangerous situation
that threatens an unjust injury. And Pufendorf, like Grotius who
equates innocent with unoffending (in the sense of not creating a dangerous situation threatening an unjust injury),108 implied that selfdefense against insane or reasonably mistaken—and therefore morally innocent—aggressors is justifiable: “[I]t is enough that the other
have no right to attack or kill me, and there be on my side no obligation to die in vain.”109 While the person posing the threat may be morally innocent, the threat he is posing is therefore nonetheless “unjust”
in the sense that there is no objectively good reason warranting it. The
defender need not tolerate it.110 These arguments may be correct at
their core—but they overlook the moral distinction between morally
culpable and innocent threats. This, for the reasons articulated above,
is an important distinction that the present analysis seeks to both recognize and act on.
The position taken here, then, is to some extent in accord with the
prevailing undifferentiated perspective on self-defense. Under the
value-based model, a defender still has a right of self-defense against
moral innocents, such as madmen, sleepwalkers, and those laboring
under a mistake, who pose an immediate and identifiable threat. Such
actors, after all, threaten the defender’s autonomy with harm the defender cannot be legally required to absorb.111 Once an actor through
his actions—either voluntary or involuntary, culpable or blameless—
becomes an immediate unjust threat to another, his right to non-interference in his personal domain is either conditionally waived or forfeited (depending on the culpability of the attacker) to an extent
compatible with the implicated decision grounds. The right to non-in108. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 62 (William Whewell ed.,
Lawbook Exchange 2009) (1853).
109. 2 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS JUXTA LEGEM
NATURALEM LIBRI DUO [ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN] 31 (Frank Gardner
Moore trans., Wildy & Sons 1964) (1673).
110. See generally Rönnau & Hohn, supra note 65, at sidenotes 64, 68–73; Krause,
supra note 97, at 478; Jeremy Horder, Redrawing the Boundaries of Self-Defence,
58 MOD. L. REV. 431, 435–38 (1995); Suzanne Uniacke, Self-Defense and Natural
Law, 36 AM. J. JURIS. 73, 95 (1991); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 42–46 (William Parent ed., 1986). For
an analogous discussion of morally innocent actors in tort law, see JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 332 (1992). For a criticism of Coleman’s argument, see
Alec Walen, Consensual Sex Without Assuming the Risk of Carrying an Unwanted Fetus; Another Foundation for the Right to an Abortion, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 1051, 1098–1100 (1997). See also UNIACKE, supra note 26, at 157–58 (“[T]he
permissibility of acting directly to block an unjust immediate threat does not derive from, or depend upon, culpability on the part of the unjust threat . . . .”).
111. See generally Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense Against Morally Innocent Threats, in
CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 385–406 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009);
Lesch, supra note 98, at 103.
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terference, moreover, remains forfeited until he ceases to be such a
threat.
A significant point of departure, however, is that the undifferentiated approach pays insufficient attention to the exceptionally significant normative distinction between culpable and innocent threats.112
In so doing, this prevailing approach to the forfeiture of rights conundrum fatally overlooks that all attacks are, in fact, not created equally.
To the contrary, morally distinguishable attacks and attackers compel
morally defensible and gradated responses.
Moving from the general to the specific, while threats of harm from
innocents threaten defenders with concrete losses (see value #4),
threats of wrong posed by culpable attackers additionally threaten to
impute lesser standing to the defender (value #3). Similarly, the concept that all individuals owe each other a basic obligation of “human
solidarity” (and, thus, the responsibility to refrain from harming
others when possible) can reasonably be interpreted more strictly in
the context of morally innocent attackers who do not threaten the imputation of lesser standing (value #3).113
Parting from Uniacke’s approach, then, the value-based model for
normative and qualitative reasons draws a sharp distinction between
culpable and innocent threats—that is, between (a) wrongs implicating waiver and (b) harms implicating forfeiture. These differences, in
turn, affect the relative weights accorded to the value-based model’s
decision grounds. The distinction between waiver and forfeiture of an
attacker’s rights provides us with the ability to meaningfully distinguish between culpable and non-culpable threats. This, in turn, allows
us to overcome the widely recognized deficiencies in Uniacke and
Leverick’s conception of the undifferentiated aggressor posing an “unjust and immediate” threat.
IV. WHEN IS DEFENSIVE FORCE “NECESSARY”?114
Having set the analytical stage, we can now turn to self-defense’s
most fundamental (and most litigated) limitation, namely, the requirement of necessity.115 For defensive force to have been “necessary,” the force used must have been indispensable or unavoidable if
the actor was to successfully block or fend off the threat.116 The
(forced-choice) logic is that the attacker cannot complain that his
112. See generally Re’em Segev, Fairness, Responsibility and Self-Defense, 45 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 383, 392 n.27 (2005).
113. See generally Lesch, supra note 98, at 103–04.
114. The issue of proportionality will be addressed in Part V.
115. See generally Fritz Allhoff, Self-Defense Without Imminence, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1527, 1531–48 (2019); Robert Leider, Taming Self-Defense: Using Deadly Force
To Prevent Escapes, 70 FLA. L. REV. 971, 996–1002 (2018).
116. See UNIACKE, supra note 26, at 32.
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rights were violated if he puts the defender in a position where the
defender faces the Hobson’s choice of either tolerating the serious intrusion or using the reasonable means available to him that are required to block or fend off the attack.
But necessity also plays a (and perhaps the) critical part in reinforcing the humanitarian core of self-defense law, as reflected most
directly in value #2 (protection of the attacker). As Leider has persuasively maintained, the centrality of the necessity requirement not only
protects aggressors’ rights to due process of law, but it relatedly also
prevents situations where the putative defender might otherwise employ self-preferential force too early.117 Put another way, the limitation is thought to make self-defense unavailable if the aggressors have
not yet made up their minds to attack.118 Necessity, therefore, helps
us understand the boundaries of self-defense. In so doing, it defines
the role of citizens and the roles of the state and, consistent with value
#1, allocates their respective permissions to lawfully deploy
violence.119
A.

Distinguishing Self-Defense from Necessity and Duress

Is self-defense a species of necessity? Or perhaps an example of
duress? The defense of necessity, after all, is said to apply in cases of
emergency when an individual is faced with a choice between two
evils.120 Similar to duress situations,121 the individual who finds herself in such a predicament must decide whether to break the literal
terms of the criminal law or whether to instead abide by the law’s
requirements and thereby permit the even greater harm to occur.122
117. Leider, supra note 115, at 1002; see also V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal
Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1725 (2003) (“The doctrine of necessity
requires that the defendant cannot take the law into her own hands—that the
protester, for example, must assert her claims before the legislature.”).
118. See Leider, supra note 115, at 1002.
119. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO STATE J. CRIM.
L. 449, 460–61 (2008).
120. See generally Ivó Coca-Vila, Conflicting Duties in Criminal Law, 22 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 34, 37–40 (2019); Christopher, supra note 43, at 1153–54; Michele Cotton,
The Necessity Defense and the Moral Limits of Law, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 35, 40
(2015).
121. See generally Frances E. Chapman & Jason MacLean, “Pulling the Patches” of the
Patchwork Defence of Duress: A Comment on R. v. Aravena, 62 CRIM. L.Q. 420,
426–27 (2015); Sabina Zgaga, The Defence of Duress in International Criminal
Law, 68 PRAVNIK 95, 126 (2013).
122. See generally Monu Bedi, Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common
Law Defenses of Duress and Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575, 577–78 (2011); Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive
and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2002); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN
W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4 (1986).
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The value-based model’s answer is that self-defense is neither an example of necessity nor a form of duress.
Another hypothetical may help shine some additional light on this
point. Assume Steve is driving a train with defective breaks. Steve
approaches a “Y” in the tracks and discovers to his horror that Giacomo, Brett, Greg, Denny, Tony, and John are tied to the left tracks,
whereas Eric and Paul are doing repair work on the track to the right.
Eric and Paul are facing away from the train and from the others and
are unable to hear the oncoming train because they are deaf. Steve is
thus faced with a conflict of rights in which either outcome will cause
the death of innocent life. Under these circumstances, Steve decides to
divert the train to the right tracks because this saves the lives of Giacomo, Brett, Greg, Denny, Tony, and John, although it causes the
deaths of Eric and Paul. Steve will be able to claim necessity.
Switching gears, if Victor is attacked by the insane Thomas, is not
Victor normatively in the same position as Steve in the prior hypothetical? After all, both, through impersonal necessity, find themselves in
a conflict of rights situation. In the case of the insane Thomas, this
impersonal necessity is brought about by the disease working on
Thomas’s powers of perception and judgment.
While this parity argument has initial appeal, it at a deeper level
overlooks the relevance of the source of the threatened harm.123 It
merely relies on necessity’s utilitarian and teleological public policy
claim that otherwise illegal conduct is permitted because “higher values” are achieved at the expense of “lesser values.” In the first scenario, Steve diverts the train even though this act causes Eric and Paul’s
deaths. Steve is immune from punishment because there was a moral
imperative for his actions that provided an overriding reason for the
otherwise illegal conduct. Although Eric and Paul’s rights were violated, the violations are deemed legal.
Necessity cases, therefore, involve an actor who is said to be morally compelled to act in the way that he did.124 If, for example, Andrew
forces Victor at gunpoint to block the road with Victor’s car so that the
insane Thomas is unable to drive to town with a bomb, Andrew’s actions clearly violate Victor’s rights. Andrew’s conduct furthermore
would not qualify as self-defense since Victor was not the source of the

123. See generally Michael D. Bayles, Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress, 33
WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 (1987).
124. See generally Dennis J. Baker, Mutual Combat Complicity, Transferred Intention/Defenses and the Exempt Party Defense, 37 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 205, 260–61
(2016); Tsachi Keren-Paz, Injuries from Unforeseeable Risks Which Advance Medical Knowledge: Restitution-Based Justification for Strict Liability, 5 J. EUR.
TORT L. 275, 282–83 (2014).
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threat.125 Andrew may, nevertheless, be justified under the doctrine
of necessity, because his commandeering of Victor’s car avoids a
“greater evil.”126 (That said, it is conceded that one can of course come
up with morally challenging cases involving passive threats where
drawing the line is more difficult.)
Circling in a bit more on the central point here, self-defense cases
do not involve violations of the attacker’s rights, for the attacker himself poses the threat,127 thereby conditionally creating a gap in his
otherwise inviolable personal domain. The insane Thomas, for example, is the source of the unjust threat (and threatens value #4, protection of the defender’s autonomy); his rights are therefore not violated
when Victor uses reasonable force to repel the threat he poses. In
short, whether there is a conditional gap and what the size of it might
be are determined on a sliding scale informed by the balance of the
implicated decision grounds.128
Duress cases are even more readily distinguishable. They involve
compliance with an illegal or wrongful threat, rather than the avoidance or neutralization of harm through force.129 The evil Andrew
forces Victor to attack Peter and threatens to kill Victor’s son if he
fails to comply. Peter does not pose an unjustified threat to Victor, and
therefore, Victor may not claim that he was acting in self-defense.
Victor may, however, argue that he was acting under duress and
should not be punished. But duress of circumstances cases—where the
threat emanates from the circumstances rather than from a verbal
command130—are more challenging in that they share a great deal in
common with the passive threat issues discussed below in subsection
VI.A.3.131

125. See generally Arlette Grabczynska & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Justifying Killing
in Self-Defence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 235 (2009) (reviewing FIONA
LEVERICK, KILLING IN SELF-DEFENCE (2006)).
126. See generally Peter Westen, Poor Wesley Hohfeld, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 449, 452
(2018); David O. Brink, Retributivism and Legal Moralism, 25 RATIO JURIS 496,
505 (2012).
127. See generally Jeremy Horder, Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding
the Relationship, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 143 (1998).
128. See id.
129. See generally BAKER, supra note 45, at 1119–20; Ken Levy, Does Situationism
Excuse? The Implications of Situationism for Moral Responsibility and Criminal
Responsibility, 68 ARK. L. REV. 731, 776 (2015); Orit Gan, Contractual Duress
and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171, 178 (2013).
130. See generally Glenys Williams, Necessity: Duress of Circumstances or Moral Involuntariness?, 43 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 1, 26–27 (2014).
131. See generally R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 (appeal taken from Eng.) (requiring
the defendant to reasonably believe there was a threat of death or serious injury
and to have a reasonable reaction).
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The Relationship Between Necessity and Imminence

Assume that Andrew and Victoria both live on an isolated ranch in
the Rocky Mountain West. The ranch lacks telephones or other means
of communicating with the outside world and is surrounded by a vast
and inhospitable high-mountain desert. It would be impossible for anyone to cross the desert to the nearest town of Walden by foot. All of
the ranch’s water, moreover, is supplied by a single water main that
runs from Walden to the ranch. Andrew and Victoria therefore have to
drive their car to Walden when they need supplies. One cold night,
Andrew is very angry because he believes that Victoria has been unfaithful to him. He verbally and physically abuses Victoria. After severely beating her, Andrew says, “Now that that’s taken care of, I am
going to drive to Walden, cut off the water supply to the house, and let
you die a slow death of dehydration.”
Based on Andrew’s past behavior, Victoria has no doubt that Andrew will in fact fulfill his threat and leave her to die. Andrew gets
into the car and starts to drive off. Victoria knows that if she does not
stop Andrew he will act on his plan. She, therefore, grabs a rifle out of
the closet and fatally shoots Andrew as he drives by the house on his
way to Walden. Andrew of course was not yet in a position where he
could cut off the water supply, but if Victoria had not used deadly force
to prevent Andrew’s “escape,” her death would have been certain. The
question is whether our value-based model will (or, rather, should)
permit this sort of preemptive strike.
Self-defense laws are most commonly drafted so that defensive
force is authorized only if it is necessary to prevent an imminent attack.132 Such a formulation treats necessity and imminence as independent requirements; the threatened attack must be imminent, and
the defensive force must also be necessary to prevent the attack.133
Under this decoupled standard, Victoria’s use of force could be viewed
as unjustified because the threatened harm was not technically imminent. Andrew, after all, still had to make the long drive to Walden to
turn off the water supply. Although Victoria’s defensive force remained her only way of escaping certain death, this common standard
132. See, e.g., Allhoff, supra note 115, at 1541–48; United States v. Jennings, 855 F.
Supp. 1427, 1435–36 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (citing United States v. Oakie, 12 F.3d
1436, 1443 (8th Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 61 F.3d 897 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Allhoff, supra note
115, at 1545–46 (discussing the commentary to Model Penal Code § 3.04, which
provides that although “imminence” is the common formulation, the Model Penal
Code’s formulation requires a belief that the defensive action is “immediately
necessary”); Leider, supra note 115, at 1002 (“Defensive violence is only justifiable based on an actual or threatened imminent attack.”).
133. See generally Leider, supra note 115, at 995 n.158; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 247
(2004).
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would not authorize it (more on this in subsection VI.A.5, discussing
the value-based model’s treatment of battered intimate partner cases).
Recall that the self-defense regime developed here is also concerned with the equal standing of defenders and attackers (value #3)
and protecting the defender’s private domain (value #4).134 As such,
the value-based model permits appropriate force to be used whenever
it is immediately necessary to block or fend off an unjust threat.135
This formulation thus treats the immediacy of the threat as a factor in
determining whether the defensive force was necessary, reflecting an
unwillingness to leave defenders without the ability to lawfully protect themselves.136
Applied to our hypothetical case, this admittedly broader formulation allows the type of preemptive (and necessary) strike Victoria delivered. By explicitly and credibly threatening Victoria and engaging
in physical conduct that demonstrated his intention to act on his
threat (beating her and driving off in the car to engage in conduct calculated to end her life), Andrew, as a matter of fact, became an immediate and culpable threat to Victoria, even though the actual conduct
may be delayed. Under the value-based model, Victoria is, therefore,
both internally and externally justified in killing Andrew in order to
save her own life.137
Others, however, will see this differently. Leverick, for example,
will likely rely on her baseline, firm conviction about the equal value
of the lives of aggressors and defenders to reject such a test in cases
involving battered women.138 According to Leverick: “[S]elf-defence is
only permissible where the accused faced a threat of death (or one of
near equivalent seriousness) or where such a threat might reasonably
be assumed. The level of violence faced by the majority of battered
134. See supra sections II.C–D.
135. This formulation has been accepted in a number of U.S. jurisdictions. See, e.g., 18
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 505 (West 2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31, 9.32
(West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3–4(a) (West 2020).
136. See Lesch, supra note 98, at 110–11; Shana Wallace, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered Women’s Right to Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1749, 1761–62 (2004).
137. See supra subsections III.B.1–2.
138. It will be conceded that the term “battered women” is admittedly dated. “Battered intimate partner” is more contemporary and appropriately descriptive.
That said, because the literature for years has used “battered woman” or “battered spouse,” those terms are on occasion repeated here, though not exclusively
so. For the leading, albeit controversial, research-based study of the syndrome,
see LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (4th ed. 2016). See
also Aya Gruber, The Duty To Retreat in Self-Defense Law and Violence Against
Women, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (July 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780199935352.013.5 [https://perma.cc/JYX9-8MQX] (discussing the
complex relationship between the duty to retreat in self-defense law and violence
against women).
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women is unlikely to meet this threshold.”139 Leverick, consistent
with her baseline objective of protecting both culpable and innocent
life, favors a strict temporal interpretation of imminence and disfavors
a substitute necessity test. She believes that such loosening of the imminence requirement in favor of “lesser values, such as personal honour or the desire for revenge,” fails to accord maximum protection to
the value of protecting the attacker’s life.140
But by sidestepping the more challenging discussion of exactly
what other values specifically are (or even might be) implicated in battered intimate partner cases, and by focusing so narrowly on motivations such as “revenge,” commentators like Leverick miss the
opportunity to anchor their analysis with stouter analytical gear.141
Their view that a fully innocent defender must endure extreme violence and maiming amounting to serious bodily injury (but not
threatened death) at the hands of a fully culpable attacker, furthermore, finds no support in any known jurisdiction (a fact that may
matter little in some scholarly circles, but that is a rather significant,
though curiously largely overlooked, point for those in pursuit of
meaningful real-world law reform).
The skeptic may of course assert that in our hypothetical situation
Andrew could possibly cool down and change his mind during his
drive. He could ultimately decide not to kill Victoria (or at least not to
kill her today). But can’t the same argument be made in the context of
almost any attack? It, after all, is always possible that an aggressor
will at the last minute (or second) stop just short of, say, pulling the
trigger of his gun or plunging his knife into the defender’s chest.
The position taken here—and which finds support in most jurisdictions—is that if the judge or juror concludes, given the surrounding
circumstances and the relationship between the parties, that the attack would in fact be carried out (that is, that the defender is externally justified) and that the defender reasonably interpreted and
reacted to this threat (that is, that the defender is internally justified),
then the defender’s conduct must be legally justified.142 The common
139. LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 91 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 102. Interestingly, however, Leverick momentarily appears to adopt a diluted equality of life position when she advocates in favor of replacing the imminence test with one focused on “inevitability of harm” because that “would bring
at least some battered women within the ambit of the law of self-defence.” Id. at
108.
141. Cf. Lesch, supra note 98, at 110 (arguing that defenders have the right to defend
against the fear of future attack that violent intimate partners may create).
142. See also supra subsections III.B.1–2 (discussing external and internal justification). See generally Shazia Choudhry & Jonathan Herring, Righting Domestic Violence, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 95, 109 (2006) (“[T]he key question should be
whether the infringement of the right is necessary to avoid an inevitable attack,
rather than whether there is imminence.”).
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“necessary to prevent an imminent threat” language, in contrast, forecloses the possibility that a jury could rule Victoria’s action as selfdefensive for no good reason. Such an outcome is normatively undesirable and is inconsistent with the balance of the decision grounds.
For illustrative purposes, what follows is intended to broadly
demonstrate (albeit in admittedly rough terms that are not meant to
imply any quasi-scientific certainty) how the value-based model might
approach the hypothetical situation’s challenging fact pattern:
Nature of Threat: Culpable
Seriousness of Threat: Severe (Death)
Defensive Force: Severe (Death)
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Collective
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Function (see
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+1

Value #2: The
Attacker’s Right
0
to Life (see
section II.B)

Value #3:
Maintaining
+1
Equal Standing
(see section II.C)
Value #4:
Protecting the
Defender’s
Autonomy (see
section II.D)
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+1

Value #5:
Ensuring the
+1
Primacy of the
Legal Process
(see section II.E)

Andrew is culpably posing a serious
threat. He, therefore, has conditionally
waived his right to non-interference.
Victoria, moreover, is only using
necessary force to ward off the
threatened harming and wronging. From
a systemic perspective, permitting
deadly force here does not
inappropriately threaten the state’s
monopoly on violence.
Andrew’s decision to engage in a
culpable attack threatening death
overcomes the presumption that the
attacker’s right to life must be
safeguarded.
Andrew is aggressively claiming he will
kill Victoria, and he, therefore, is
threatening to impose his will on her and
to elevate his interests above hers.
Defensive force is necessary to ward off
this threatened imputation of unequal
standing.
Andrew’s culpable attack threatens a
severe injury (namely, death).
Victoria is facing a non-compensable
injury at the hands of a fully culpable
attacker. She, therefore, has no
acceptable or practicable legal recourse.
As a consequence, the primacy of the
legal process is not threatened by her use
of defensive force.
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Value #6:
Maintaining the
+1
Legitimacy of
the Legal Order
(see section II.F)

Value #7:
Deterrence (see
section II.G)

+1

TOTAL

+6

C.
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Refusing to permit Victoria to use
defensive force under these
circumstances could reasonably be
perceived as very unjust and, therefore,
could cause damage to the legal system’s
legitimacy (in the sense of moral
authority in the eyes of the public).
The fully culpable Andrew is threatening
Victoria with deadly force. Permitting
Victoria to counter this threat with
deadly force will, on balance, add to selfdefense’s specific and general deterrent
impact.
Deadly force is presumptively
justifiable (and +6 indicates
relatively strong justification).

Retreat and Avoiding Conflict

A person’s “private domain” can fairly be said to consist of concrete
interests and sovereignty, without which a person cannot be truly
free.143 Some will conclude therefrom that any requirement that the
defender retreat from, or avoid going to, a place where he has a legal
right to be would impermissibly infringe on his autonomy (value #4)
and in fact, would strengthen the imputation of lesser standing inherent in the threatened wronging (value #3).144 Victor, they would say,
should therefore be able to go to the local pub even though he is certain that the aggressive Andrew will also be there and will pick a fight
with Victor. In fact, the appealing argument often advanced is that, in
a free and liberal society, individuals should have the right to go anywhere they are legally permitted to be, regardless of what aggressors
they may find there, because freedom of movement is a central and
necessary part of individual autonomy (value #4).145
143. See also Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 22–23
(2016) (describing the “centrality of the individual” in our legal scheme). See generally Schopp, supra note 20, at 2075.
144. See generally Erb, supra note 95, at 597 (explaining that in extreme cases a strict
duty to retreat could force a person out of the public sphere).
145. See id; see also supra section II.D (discussing value #4 (protecting the defender’s
autonomy)).
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Leverick disagrees. She characterizes the “strong retreat rule”—
requiring the defender to make an attempt to retreat before using
force “only if an opportunity to do so actually exists”—as the most
“morally appropriate” because, by requiring retreat whenever it is a
safe possibility, it (consistent with the approach taken by the U.S.
Model Penal Code) “promotes maximum respect for the right to
life.”146 She correspondingly rejects the “no retreat rule” because it
does not seek to “sav[e] both the life of the aggressor and the life of the
victim.”147 For similar reasons she is unpersuaded by the “weak retreat rule”:
Allowing the accused to make the choice to use violence on any occasion where
this could have been avoided implies that the law does not respect the right to
life of an aggressor and places some other value, such as honour, dignity, or
vengeance, higher than that of the aggressor’s life.148

Leverick’s approach, in short, effectively places near-exclusive emphasis on value #2 (protecting the attacker’s right to life). The valuebased model, in contrast, considers a broader spectrum of values and
accordingly does not endorse a categorical duty to, under all circumstances, retreat or avoid places where one may become a victim. That
said, broader welfarist concerns,149 as reflected in the balance of the
value-based model’s decision grounds,150 render imposing a duty to
retreat appropriate when (1) the attacker is an innocent and (2) retreat can be achieved safely. In fact, Richardson and Goff have argued
with some persuasive force that a failure to retreat under these conditions establishes that the defender is “no longer morally innocent.”151
So, under the value-based model, if the defender knows that he will
be set upon by an innocent attacker (a person laboring under a mistake, a child, etc.) and retreat can be accomplished without materially
increasing a risk of serious harm, then values #1 and #2 counsel in
favor of requiring retreat.152 But, as already noted, these determinations occur on a sliding scale, and the related value judgments are
heavily fact-dependent.
By way of further illustration, assume Victor knows that Andrew
will threaten Victor with a beating as soon as Victor appears at the
pub. Victor knows Andrew is there because he sees Andrew through
146.
147.
148.
149.

LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 76.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 81.
See generally Mordechai Kremnitzer & Khalid Ghanayim, Proportionality and
the Aggressor’s Culpability in Self-Defense, 39 TULSA L. REV. 875, 894 (2004).
150. Consider, for example, value #1 (reducing overall societal violence), value #2 (protecting the attacker), and value #5 (ensuring the primacy of the legal process).
See supra sections II.A–B, E.
151. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 333 (2012).
152. See supra sections II.A–B.
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the window of the pub. According to Leverick, in a situation like this,
“the value of freedom of movement is outweighed by the weightier
value of minimizing violence.”153
The view developed here agrees with Leverick to a point. By entering the pub with this knowledge, Victor knowingly increases the likelihood that a conflict will arise, thus negatively implicating value #1
(collective violence reduction by protecting the state’s monopoly on
force), value #2 (protection of the individual attacker), and value #5
(ensuring the primacy of the legal process).154 The criminal justice
system’s interest in protecting Victor’s rights can, therefore, fairly be
said to be negatively impacted by the fact that Victor in essence assumed a certain amount of risk when he entered the pub, thereby
weakening the impact of value #3 (equal standing), value #4 (protecting the defender’s autonomy), and value #7 (deterrence).155
It, after all, would not be asking too much for Victor to avoid this
particular pub on this evening, even if this causes him to suffer some
minor inconvenience (he could, for example, inform the police of the
situation).156 Similarly, if a defender refuses to retreat from a place
when escape is possible, decision grounds such as protecting the equal
standing among people (value #3) and protecting the defender’s autonomy (value #4) become less weighty. This is particularly so if it is reasonably foreseeable that the defensive conduct necessary to thwart the
attack will be severe—thus adding weight to safeguarding the collective violence-reduction function of the criminal law (value #1), protecting the attacker (value #2), and ensuring the primacy of the legal
process (value #5).157
While the burden of course always remains on others not to become
threats in the first place, the value-based model places a corresponding responsibility on individuals to at least attempt to avoid places
where they know they are likely to be faced with a situation where
they either submit to the attack or (more likely) must impose serious
costs on the attacker. Similarly, individuals facing innocent threats
(not implicating values #3 and #7) should retreat if they can do so
safely. Even if the threat is culpable, depending on the nature of the
threatened attack and the harm threatened (most directly involving
consideration of values #1, #2, and #4), retreat may be called for.

153.
154.
155.
156.

LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 126.
See supra sections II.A–B, E.
See supra sections II.C–D, G.
But see Erb, supra note 95, at 597 (arguing that a restricted duty to retreat allows
aggressors to limit innocents’ personal freedom).
157. See supra sections II.A–E.
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V. WHEN IS DEFENSIVE FORCE “PROPORTIONAL” TO THE
THREATENED HARM?
A.

Rejecting Strict Proportionality and Addressing
Excessive Force

Some, like Leverick158 and Wallerstein,159 wish to impose exacting
proportionality between the harm threatened and the defensive force
used.160 In this view, the systemic demand for precise proportionality
between the severity of the punishment and the severity of the committed crime should also apply in the context of actions taken in selfdefense.161
Leverick, by way of illustration, concedes that pregnancy is an “extremely unpleasant potential consequence of a rape”; nevertheless,
adopting a strict proportionality approach, she asserts that deadly
force to prevent rape should only be permitted if the threatened attack
“approaches the standard of a wrong equivalent to a deprivation of life
itself.”162 Given, moreover, that respect for autonomy requires the
wrongdoer to in some sense “will” his own coercion (by threatening a
wrong rather than a mere harm), the argument advanced by commentators like Leverick is that the same principle could be said to also
require that the wrongdoer will the measure of his coercion.
This argument, however, overlooks that punishment is an institutionalized legal response to wrongdoing that is constrained by systemic factors in the way it is distributed.163 Stated another way, while
consistency may require a uniform system of sentencing that incorpo158. See LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 143–52 (demanding precise proportionality so that
severe injury (such as loss of a limb) is not enough to, without more, justify
deadly defensive force).
159. See Shlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of Forced
Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 1024–25 (2005).
160. Cf. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist
Homicide Law Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 33, 74 (2010); Renée Lettow Lerner, The Worldwide Popular Revolt Against Proportionality in Self-Defense Law, 2 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 331, 358–61 (2006). See generally Richard J.
Arneson, Self-Defense and Culpability: Fault Forfeits First, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
231, 261–62 (2018); Marvin Lim, A New Approach to the Ethics of Life: The “Will
to Live” in Lieu of Inherent Dignity or Autonomy-Based Approaches, 24 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 27 (2014); Benjamin Porat, Lethal Self-Defense Against a Rapist
and the Challenge of Proportionality: Jewish Law Perspective, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 123, 128 (2013); Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 149, at 894–99.
161. See LEVERICK, supra note 1, at 143–52.
162. Id. at 157 (emphasis added). Note, however, that determining the “standard of a
wrong” inevitably involves the same line-drawing that Leverick finds objectionable in the context of deadly force in defense of property. See id. at 134–42.
163. See generally Mihai Raul Secula, Particularities of Contraventions Against Other
Forms of Legal Liability, 2010 L. ANNALS TITU MAIORESCU U. 159, 161–62; Victor
Tadros, The Scope and the Grounds of Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 91,
113–17 (2008); Frank Haldemann, Another Kind of Justice: Transitional Justice
as Recognition, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 675, 705–06 (2008).
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rates strict proportionality, the same cannot reasonably be said to be
true for unpredictable, heat-of-the-moment actions taken in selfdefense.
Self-defense, after all, is anticipatory in the sense that its aim is
the avoidance of harm.164 Punishment (through sentencing), in contrast, is largely retrospective in that it responds to harm with retaliatory harm that is meted out for a variety of reasons, including general
and specific deterrence, incapacitation, and prevention.165 Punishment thus occurs under different circumstances and for different reasons than self-defensive conduct. Attempts to analogize the two on the
basis of “willed coercion” consequently lack persuasive force.
Under the approach developed here, the argument for cabining a
defender’s ability to exercise force is stronger when the attacker is
morally innocent—and therefore does not fully implicate value #3
(equal standing), value #4 (protecting the defender’s autonomy), value
#5 (primacy of the legal process), and value #7 (deterrence).166 As discussed previously in the context of the decision grounds’ concern with
ensuring equal standing among people and deterring crime,167 beyond
willed coercion there are sound normative (and utilitarian) reasons for
imposing additional limitations on the amount of force that can be
used against an innocent attacker.
It is of course true that the innocent attacker also threatens concrete harm to the defender. But it is important to remember that the
innocent attacker does not deny the intersubjective foundation of the
defender’s rights (value #3) in the way that a culpable attacker
does.168 And as already noted, the law cannot expect a defender to
absorb an attacker’s seriously harmful and unjustified, though innocent, attack. Such a requirement would compel the defender to
subordinate his autonomy and concrete interests to the welfare of the
attacker.169 A defender may, therefore, under the value-based method
use force even against an innocent attacker. But the amount of harm
threatened by the attacker will be more carefully weighed against the
164. See generally Marina Angel, Why Judy Norman Acted in Reasonable Self-Defense:
An Abused Woman and a Sleeping Man, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 65 (2008).
165. See generally Rebecca L. Rausch, Reframing Roe: Property over Privacy, 27
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 28, 50–51 (2012); Volker Behr, Punitive Damages
in American and German Law—Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 105, 113 (2003).
166. See supra sections II.C–E, G; see also Rönnau & Hohn, supra note 65, at sidenotes 6, 13, 74; Volker Erb, Notwehr und Notstand, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR
ZUM STRAFGESETZBUCH, BAND 1, sidenotes 60, 209 (Bernd von Heintschel-Heinegg
ed., 2017).
167. See supra sections II.C, G.
168. See supra section II.C; see also Erb, supra note 166, at sidenote 18; SUSANNE
RETZKO, DIE ANGRIFFSVERURSACHUNG BEI DER NOTWEHR 127 (2001); JOACHIM
RENZIKOWSKI, NOTSTAND UND NOTWEHR 275 (1994).
169. See supra section II.D.
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amount of defensive force that may be used, whether safe retreat is
required, and what amount of harm the defender can be expected to
absorb.
Whenever a defender uses force, moreover, she may err and use
more force than is actually necessary to ward off the culpable threat.
Following the reasoning of Grotius,170 an unreasonable error that results in the defender using excessive force to ward off the threat intrudes on the violence-reducing function of the criminal law by
threatening the state’s monopoly on force (value #1). It also impermissibly harms the individual attacker (value #2) because such force lies
outside the conditional “gap” created by the person purportedly posing
the threat. Consistent with the value-based model’s treatment of mistake,171 then, a reasonable mistake as to the amount of force necessary to thwart the attack will excuse the defender.172 An
unreasonable mistake of fact, on the other hand, renders self-defense
unavailable.
B.

Deadly Force in Defense of Property

Controversially in some circles,173 the value-based model, on balance, agrees with the U.S. and English courts that deadly force in defense of property should, as a general rule, be rejected. While certainly
susceptible to different normative appraisals—and recognizing the
power of the argument that property can in fact be a genuine extension of the “self”174—the value-based model nevertheless agrees that
170. See generally Robert Feenstra, The Dutch Kantharos Case and the History of Error in Substantia, 48 TUL. L. REV. 846, 856 (1974).
171. See supra sections II.A–B.
172. See supra section III.B.
173. The majority position among German scholars, for example, holds that deadly
force may be used to defend property. See, e.g., CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT ALLGEMEINER TEIL 590 (3d ed. 1997); JESCHECK & WEIGEND, supra note 80, at 348 n.49.
But see Luı́s Greco, Notwehr und Proportionalität, 165 Goltdammer’s Archiv für
Strafrecht (GA) 665, 671 (2018) (discussing a minority position that even the
threatened loss of =
C 5,000 is insufficient to justify deadly defensive force); Klaus
Bernsmann, Überlegungen zur tödlichen Notwehr bei nicht lebensbedrohlichen
Angriffen, 104 ZStW 290, 326 (1992) (contending that deadly force in defense of
property is never justified). See generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.42(3)(A)
(West 2019) (stating that the use of deadly force in defense of property is justified
when “the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other
means”); Robert Schopp, Self-Defense, in IN HARM’S WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JOEL FEINBERG (Jules Coleman & Allen Buchanan eds., 1994), discussed in Kaufman, supra note 92, at 27–28.
174. See generally Daniel Austin Green, Indigenous Intellect: Problems of Calling
Knowledge Property and Assigning It Rights, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 335,
344–45 (2009); Meir Dan-Cohen, The Value of Ownership, 1 GLOB. JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 25 (2001); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 343
(1988); Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental
Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 91 (1986).
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while most (though not necessarily all) property interests are generally compensable, a human life is not.175
Of course, it is difficult to ex ante determine whether law enforcement will be able to recover the property or arrest the thieves so that
alternative compensation can be sought. As articulated here, however,
the criminal law’s objectives include violence reduction and protection
of the state’s monopoly on force (value #1), protection of the attacker’s
presumptive right to life (value #2), ensuring the primacy of the legal
process (value #5), and avoiding results that could threaten the legitimacy of the criminal law (value #6).176 Consequently, the law, on balance, would be hard-pressed to permit a defender to extinguish
another’s life solely because the defender at the time believes this to
be the only way for him to ensure that his property is not damaged or
permanently taken away—impacting value #3 (equal standing) and
value #4 (protecting the defender’s autonomy)—or to send a deterrent
message to would-be criminals (value #7).177
That said, and on a more practical note, threats purely to property
occur relatively infrequently. Any indication by the attacker that he
also poses a physical threat—for example, if the defender attempts to
stop the theft of, or damage to, the property—will take the case
outside of the realm of defense of property, shifting the value-based
model’s balance of concerns.
As a slight aside, my thinking on this topic has shifted over the
years (candidly, having children has materially contributed to the
softening of my views on deadly force in defense of property—and, for
that matter, also in other contexts). I, therefore, today find myself
challenged to agree with either of the standard hard-edged “yes”
(Schopp) or “no” (Leverick and Ashworth) answers when it comes to
whether deadly force should ever be authorized in defense of any property. But the attractiveness of the value-based model is that it provides the analytical flexibility to consider different circumstances and
normative assumptions. Not everyone will reach the same conclusion,
but the analysis can still follow the same common framework.
C.

Responding to “Trivial” Threats

We have shown that both innocent and culpable threats infringe on
the defender’s autonomy (value #4).178 We have also discussed how
and why the value-based model devalues threats to property when
175. See generally Kaufman, supra note 92, at 28.
176. See supra sections II.A–B, E–F.
177. See Robert Pest, Die Erforderlichkeit der Notwehrhandlung, in DER ALLGEMEINE
TEIL DES STRAFRECHTS IN DER AKTUELLEN RECHTSPRECHUNG 165 (Fabian Stam &
Andreas Werkmeister eds., 2019); Green, supra note 31, at 501; see also supra
sections II.C–D, G (discussing value #3, value #4, and value #7).
178. See supra section II.D.
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compared to threats of physical harming.179 So does this mean that a
person can use deadly force to, say, prevent another from stepping on
one’s toes if that is the only way to avoid the threatened physical
“harm” (or, rather, discomfort)?
1.

A Comparison with Schopp’s Approach

Schopp, as noted, contends that a liberal society must treat any
culpable infringement of an individual’s autonomy as extremely serious.180 At the very heart of this argument lies the strict separation
between public and private spheres of action. Relying heavily on the
work of Feinberg181 and Rawls,182 Schopp argues that “substantive
liberals” (like him) consider sovereignty a categorical, underivative,
non-instrumental, and, most significantly, non-compensable fundamental value.183 The right to self-determination in the public sphere,
the right to unfettered choice in those matters falling into the private
domain, and equality of citizenship are thus central to Schopp’s thesis.
He concludes that only a system allowing largely unlimited discretionary authority in the private sphere can be described as “liberal” in this
sense. A person’s private sphere should therefore largely be beyond
the reach of political interference.184
Schopp uses the example of an elderly farmer who is working at
her market stall. A local bully approaches the stall and takes one of
the farmer’s apples. When she asks the bully to return the apple, he
taunts the farmer for her inability to stop him, so the farmer takes a
handgun from under her apron and kills the bully. According to
Schopp, the shooting was necessary to prevent the theft of the apple.
It, therefore, “does not seem counterintuitive to say that [the farmer]
was justified” in shooting the bully dead.185 Though this outcome will
likely strike most as overly harsh, it is predictable in light of Schopp’s
stipulations.
When subjected to closer examination, however, some weaknesses
begin to emerge. For example, Schopp provides that “gratuitous” defensive force is not permitted.186 This, however, is not much different
than saying necessity is required. Moreover, to simply assert that the
“private sphere” is outside the reach of the criminal law’s influence
and that an individual’s sovereignty can never be infringed because it
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See supra section V.B.
See SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 83–88.
See generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 28–31 (1986).
See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4–21 (2005).
SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 67.
Id. at 77; see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 770–72 (1986) (reaffirming that the Constitution promises that aspects
of the private sphere are largely beyond government reach).
185. SCHOPP, supra note 3, at 84.
186. Id. at 78.

2021]

CRACKING SELF-DEFENSE

57

is non-compensable are conclusory assertions of belief demanding
principled (and, it is argued, value-based) support. Schopp, however,
provides no such arguments.
The fundamental difficulty with Schopp’s categorical conception of
individual autonomy, in short, is that it is challenging to square it
with life in a modern society. Whether called “welfarist” or “humanitarian” concerns, or “values #1, #2, and #5 issues,” life routinely, predictably, and justifiably imposes on citizens demands that they must at
times restrict their otherwise autonomous spheres of activity in order
to promote other legitimate interests.187 Put another way, we do not
live on an island. As discussed above, restricting certain purely autonomous action is in fact a (or perhaps the) core function of the criminal
law.188
In sum, the position taken here diverges from Schopp’s theory in
part because the value-based model views trivial harms as adding little (or, indeed negative) weight to competing decision grounds, such as
violence reduction and protection of the state’s monopoly on force
(value #1), protection of the attacker (value #2), and ensuring the primacy of the legal process (value #5).189 While Schopp’s position may
offer additional protection to the defender’s autonomy (value #4) and
increase deterrence (value #7),190 it does so at such a great cost in
terms of the exercise of disproportionate force, implicating values #1
and #2. Indeed, it can be said to potentially undermine the moral legitimacy of the legal order (value #6).191
In cases involving trivial threats, defensive force must be limited
by more than simple necessity. Contrary to Schopp’s claim—and providing further support for the hypothesis’s assumptions about the importance of transparency to sound decision-making—the nature and
amount of harm threatened very directly impact the implicated values. The interplay with the facts and the values, in turn, provide a
reasonable (and reasoned) argument for whether the conduct should
qualify as justified self-defense.192

187. See generally Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L.
REV. 387, 466–67 (2012); Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1171, 1174–75 (1993).
188. See also A.P. Simester & Andreas von Hirsch, On the Legitimate Objectives of
Criminalisation, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 367, 376–78 (2016) (discussing when the
government should regulate harmful activity). See generally supra sections
II.A–D.
189. See supra sections II.A–B, E.
190. See supra sections II.D, G.
191. See supra sections II.A–B, F.
192. See generally supra section II.C.
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Subjective or Objective Evaluation of Triviality?

Assume Andrew is about to dispossess Victor of a stamp that,
viewed objectively, is of little financial value. To Victor, however, the
stamp holds immense value because it was a special gift from his
grandfather who spent years trying to locate and purchase it. Consistent with the logic underlying the requirement that mistakes of fact
must be objectively reasonable,193 the position taken here is that triviality must likewise be determined objectively based on a “reasonable
person” standard.194
An exception to this rule, however, is carved out for situations in
which the attacker in fact knows that the object he is threatening has
a particular subjective value to the defender (that is, Andrew is aware
that the stamp’s theft constitutes a subjectively serious intrusion on
Victor’s personal autonomy (value #4) and, relatedly, realizes that
such a theft reflects significant disrespect to Victor’s equal standing
(value #3)).195 In contrast, an individual who, due to some personal
idiosyncrasy, unreasonably places a nontrivial value on an objectively
worthless item such as, say, a napkin, will not qualify for this possible
exception to the general rule.
If then the attacker knows that the (objectively) trivial interest
threatened has a special (subjective) value for the defender, and if this
attribution of subjective value is reasonable under the circumstances,
the otherwise trivial threat is weighted based on the subjective nontrivial value due to the parties’ shared understanding of the object’s
value. The attacker’s knowledge of the sentimentality magnifies the
imputation of lesser standing (value #3) such a threat implies.196
VI. OTHER CHALLENGING CASES197
A.

Innocent Attackers

Andrew is playing with his younger cousin’s air gun in his backyard. Andrew thinks that it is a harmless toy, but in reality, the gun is
193. See supra section III.B.
194. Cf. Tatjana Hörnle, Social Expectation in the Criminal Law: The Reasonable Person in a Comparative Perspective, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) (“A reference
to the ‘prudent and reliable person in the specific situation and social role of the
actor,’ which is the standard phrase in German criminal law, is better suited.”).
See generally Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 737 F.
Supp. 1070, 1083–87 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (using the reasonable person standard to
determine the triviality of alleged misconduct in the employment context).
195. See supra sections II.C–D.
196. See supra section II.C.
197. The cases that follow are described as theoretically challenging because they
have become regularly debated features of scholarly discussions on the subject.
Other issues, such as provocation, battered intimate partner cases, defense of
one’s home, retreat, and mistake, have already been discussed (or, in the case of
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loaded, the safety mechanism is disengaged, and the gun is fully pressurized. Andrew playfully points the gun at his friendly neighbor,
Victor, who happens to be walking by on his way home from work.
Victor immediately recognizes that Andrew is in fact pointing an
armed and loaded air gun at him, and he also realizes that Andrew is
about to discharge it. Victor believes Andrew does not understand that
the gun is loaded. The only way for Victor to avoid being injured by the
pellet is to throw his heavy briefcase at Andrew a split second before
Andrew pulls the trigger, thereby knocking Andrew off balance and
causing him to sustain a concussion.
Andrew’s conduct clearly constitutes a threat of harm to Victor’s
autonomy and concrete interests (value #4), for Victor will be injured
by the pellet if he does not throw his briefcase at Andrew.198 Setting
aside for now the possibility that Andrew’s conduct is subjectively
reckless because Andrew knows that he should never point even a toy
firearm at a person, it can be said that Andrew is morally innocent in
the sense that he does not intend to inflict any injury on Victor, nor
does he seek to place his own interests or desires over those of Victor
(that is, his conduct does not implicate value #3).199
1.

Nozick’s “Well Hypothetical”

Consider next a version of Nozick’s famous hypothetical in which
Brutus throws the faultless Andrew down a deep and narrow well.
The hapless Victor is already at the bottom of the well. If Victor does
not first vaporize Andrew with his ray gun, Andrew is certain to crush
Victor to death (or at a minimum, cause him great bodily injury).200
While Andrew cannot be described as an “attacker” in the ordinary
sense of the word because cruel Brutus threw him down the well
against his will—that is, value #3 (safeguarding equal standing) is not
implicated201—Andrew does, in fact, pose an actual and immediate
threat of serious harm to Victor. Whether he likes it or not, he is about
to seriously injure or crush Victor to death—thus placing great weight
on value #4 (protecting a defender’s autonomy), while arguably not
implicating value #1 (collective violence reduction), value #2 (protect-

198.
199.
200.

201.

battered intimate partner cases, will be discussed later). As Russell Christopher
puts it, the challenge inherent in an undertaking such as this is to “devise a
theory which yields the same conclusion as our nearly undisputed intuitions” and
that explains “why the initial application of force is not impermissible aggression
but rather permissible self-defense.” Christopher, supra note 69, at 571–72.
See supra section II.D.
See supra section II.C.
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34–35 (1974); see also Peter
Westen, Reflections on Joshua Dressler’s Understanding Criminal Law, 15 OHIO
STATE J. CRIM. L. 311, 326–27 (2018) (reviewing Nozick’s hypothetical and examining which actor could be justified in vaporizing another actor).
See supra section II.C.
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ing the individual attacker), value #5 (primacy of the legal process), or
value #7 (deterrence).202
While Andrew, as an innocent threat, would generally be entitled
to heightened protection because of his lack of moral culpability, the
overwhelming balance of scholars who have examined this hypothetical are in accord that the gravity of the threatened harm (namely,
death) justifies Victor vaporizing Andrew with his ray gun (a result
that will likely not so offend widely held moral standards of right and
wrong as to implicate value #6203). Victor will not be punished because
his action was justified.204 If Victor were to merely suffer slight bruising as a result of Andrew’s fall, however, then the comparatively minor threatened harm (lessening the pro-defense impact of values #1,
#2, #3, #4, and #5) would, at least from my perspective, shift the balance in favor of the innocent Andrew and would, therefore, likely require Victor to absorb the slight injury.205
2.

Contingent Threats and Innocent Shields

Contingent threats are only perceived as threats because of the direct danger coming from someone or something else. Consider, for example, a case in which an arrow is shot at the innocent Victor by
crazed assassin Andrew. Ida happens to be standing directly behind
Victor. If Victor were to jump out of the way of the arrow, Ida would
certainly be killed. Ida would nevertheless be unjustified in grabbing
Victor and holding him in place as a sort of shield because Victor is
merely a contingent threat (not implicating the previously discussed
values); Andrew’s arrow is the identifiable immediate threat.206
Innocent shields, though used as a means to ward off a threat, are
not threats themselves. Their use, therefore, once again amounts to
impermissible self-preference.207 (Of course, if Victor somehow colluded with the assassin Andrew and purposefully placed himself in
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra sections II.A–B, D–E, G.
See supra section II.F.
See supra Part III.
See supra sections II.A–E.
And this result would not change even if it were certain that the arrow would
only hit Victor in the hand, whereas it would go straight through Ida’s heart.
While some other defense such as lesser evils may apply, the right to freedom of
Victor’s discretionary control over his personal domain would make Ida’s intrusion offensive, rather than defensive, thus eliminating the possibility that she
would be able to claim self-defense.
207. For the related discussion on necessity, see Part IV. See also John Alan Cohan,
Homicide by Necessity, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 119, 177–79 (2006) (discussing the use of
“innocent shields of threats” and the theory of necessity, which may lead someone
to harm an innocent person to stop or prevent a greater harm); Jeremy Waldron,
Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 711,
714–16 (2000) (examining necessity within the context of an innocent threat and
the limits of self-defense).

2021]

CRACKING SELF-DEFENSE

61

front of Ida to prevent her from seeing the incoming arrow, Victor
himself would become part of the immediate threat and Ida could use
self-preferential force against him.)
3.

Passive Threats

The value-based model provides that a passive immediate threat
can be blocked or fended off using justified defensive force. Consider a
case in which the shipwrecked Andrew is on a ship’s rescue ladder
paralyzed by fear and unable to move.208 His inability to either go up
or down the ladder prevents the shipwrecked Victor from escaping the
pounding seas. Andrew under these circumstances poses a serious,
though innocent, direct threat of harm to Victor. Because the
threatened harm is very great, Victor is allowed to use self-defensive
force.
The reader, however, may recall our discussion immediately above
and understandably wonder why Andrew, under these circumstances,
is not considered a mere contingent threat who may not be met with
defensive force. While the distinction between a direct and a contingent threat may not always be readily drawn, perhaps the most sensible means of distinguishing the two is to consider whether there is an
objectively good reason for the paralyzed Andrew’s threatening
conduct.
Consider also the case of shipwrecked Andrew and Victor clinging
to the same piece of driftwood that will support the weight of only one
of them. Any force to shove off the other would constitute improper
self-preferential killing because there is an objectively good reason for
why both men are hanging on to the driftwood—they are trying to
save their own lives from a roiling sea.
While it is true that each is exacerbating the threat to the other,
neither is directly causing the threat—thus implicating value #3
(equal standing).209 On the other hand, if Andrew is paralyzed by fear
and unable to climb up the rescue ladder, he is preventing Victor from
escaping certain death for no objectively good reason—that is, he is
unjustifiably threatening Victor’s autonomy (value #4)210—and this
shifts the sliding-scale balance in favor of protecting the defender. Although Andrew’s reason—fear—may be understandable and non-culpable, it is not, objectively speaking, a good reason, for Andrew is
directly preventing Victor from saving himself by blocking the only
escape route.
208. This hypothetical is drawn from the 1987 Zeebrugge disaster. See generally M.S.
Herald of Free Enterprise, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS_Herald_
of_Free_Enterprise [https://perma.cc/7LB4-PGLD] (last visited Feb. 2, 2021).
209. See supra section II.C.
210. See supra section II.D.
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So, while Andrew is not morally culpable for staying in place, he,
without an objectively good reason, is threatening Victor’s autonomy
and right to life (value #4) (the other values are largely left neutral in
this scenario).211 This outcome can be contrasted with the situation in
which Victor is clinging to a plank following the sinking of a ship. If
Andrew tries to push Victor off of the plank, Victor is uniquely entitled
to use self-defense to resist because Victor is not a direct threat to
Andrew (though the converse is true).
4.

The Case of the Plank and the Two Shipwreck Survivors

Imagine again a case similar to the one discussed by Greek philosopher Carneades of Cyrene, Sanford Kadish, and others, in which Andrew and Victor are shipwrecked and have been clinging to the same
piece of driftwood.212 Assume that the driftwood slowly begins to sink
because it cannot take the weight of both men. Under our analysis, if
either shoved off the other to save himself, his action would not be
justified as self-defense because neither’s equal standing (value #3)
nor autonomy (value #4) is being threatened by the other’s actions or
inaction.213 Such a use of force would instead constitute an impermissible self-preferential act of aggression that would justify the other in
using defensive force to thwart the attack. If, in contrast, Victor held
on to the driftwood first, and Andrew subsequently tried to also cling
to it, causing it to sink, Victor would be justified in using defensive
force against Andrew because Andrew’s actions would implicate value
#3 (equal standing), value #4 (protecting the defender’s autonomy),
and (arguably) value #6 (legitimacy of the criminal law), and would,
thus, amount to impermissible self-selection.214
5.

Battered Intimate Partner Cases

The analysis turns next to the particular challenge posed by cases
where the person claiming self-defense is a battered intimate partner.
Such cases can generally be divided into two categories. In the first
category, the battered partner exercises force during an episode of
physical abuse by the batterer. In the other category of cases, the partner uses deadly force against her batterer in the absence of any occurrent abuse, but in fear or anticipation of future renewed attacks. In
the most controversial cases fitting into this latter (and more challeng211. Id.
212. See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 274 (1987). This
thought experiment was first proposed by Carneades of Cyrene and is referred to
as the “plank of Carneades.” See SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 95 (Basil Kennett trans., Lawbook Exchange 2005) (1672).
213. See supra sections II.C–D.
214. See supra sections II.C–D, F.
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ing) group, there is no overt evidence of a temporally “immediate”
threat because the batterer was, for example, sleeping.
I distinguish these two contrasting fact patterns, respectively, as
“confrontation” and “non-confrontation” cases. Theorists generally
agree that the latter group of cases presents the greatest challenge
under traditional legal doctrine. Some concentrate on the substantive
law of self-defense and the admissibility of expert testimony regarding
the battered intimate partner syndrome as relevant to self-defense.
Others criticize substantive self-defense law as biased against the battered partner (or against women generally) and advocate for either
modifications of the self-defense standards or a separate defense.215
Contemporary proponents of both perspectives largely agree, however,
that expert testimony regarding the battered intimate partner syndrome is necessary to dispel stereotypes of battered partners and to
establish various components of the traditional (or modified) defenses.216 (There is, in fact, a lively and ongoing debate over the longterm psychological effects of prolonged battery.)217
Some, like Dressler, have suggested that a battered woman acts
under duress when she kills her sleeping violent partner in order to
forestall future violence. That is, the woman avoids harm by complying with the “demands” made by a person threatening the accused.218
This argument is flawed, however, because the battered partner at
bottom is still making a self-preferential decision to kill her battering
partner. It is unconvincing to argue that the batterer is “demanding”
that his victim kill him. That is, she is not simply complying with her
batterer’s demand (which, after all, is the definition of duress—though
215. Compare Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who
Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 152 (1985) (calling for a
reconsideration of substantive self-defense doctrine), with Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 415–22 (1988)
(advocating for a “reasonable battered woman standard”).
216. See also United States v. Lopez, 913 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2019) (allowing testimony
on Battered Woman Syndrome to be heard by the jury to explain why a formerly
abused woman may respond a certain way when under duress); State v. Pisciotta,
968 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (finding the woman did not act in selfdefense, despite evidence that she was battered, because the battering only provided evidence of the woman’s state of mind—not a defense). See generally Kassandra Altantulkhuur, A Second Rape: Testing Victim Credibility Through Prior
False Accusations, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1091, 1108; Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 205–20 (1986).
217. See generally MARTIN BLINDER, The Battered Woman’s Syndrome, in PSYCHIATRY
IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW § 8:15 (5th ed. 2019).
218. Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters: Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259–82 (Stephen Shute
& Andrew Simester eds., 2002).
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the concept of “duress of circumstances,” which is sometimes treated
as a species of necessity,219 may, as discussed herein, also apply).
The particular difficulty with battered intimate partner cases is
not analytical. Rather, their facts are typically unique and challenging. Indeed, if the matter were a simple deadly-force-in-defense-of-life
situation, then there would be no need to create a separate category of
self-defense cases dealing with the particularities of intimate partners
who are battered and, therefore, react differently than a “reasonable
person” would under like circumstances.
England, in an effort to protect victims of domestic violence, enacted legislation criminalizing controlling or coercive behavior220 in
the context of intimate and family relationships.221 In particular, section 76 of the Serious Crime Act of 2015 created the new offense,
which seeks to capture abusive conduct that may not formally fit the
definitions of assault, threatening to kill or seriously injure, or stalking, but that has a serious impact on the victim even in the absence of
physical violence (or the fear thereof).222
This law, following Evan Stark’s model of coercive control, reflects
an evolution in the thinking about domestic abuse in that it helps explain why a purported defender (1) stayed in the abusive relationship
and (2) felt trapped, without any viable option other than the use of
deadly force. This information (supported by numerous studies223), in
219. See R. v. Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 (appeal taken from Eng.); R. v. Conway [1989]
QB 290, 297. While some may argue that these circumstances involve an implied
threat of harm, such a fact-specific argument cannot be given blanket acceptance.
220. See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE 83–170 (2007).
221. Serious Crime Act 2015 § 76(1). See generally Emma E. Gorbes, The Domestic
Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018: The Whole Story, 22 EDINBURGH L. REV. 406, 406–09
(2018); Marilyn McMahon & Paul McGorrery, Criminalising Controlling and Coercive Behaviour: The Next Step in the Prosecution of Family Violence, 41 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 98, 98–100 (2016).
222. See generally McMahon & McGorrery, supra note 221, at 98–100.
223. See also Amir Pichhadze, Proposals for Reforming the Law of Self-Defence, 72 J.
CRIM. L. 409, 428–29 (2008) (discussing research on the battered woman theory);
cf. Joan S. Meier, Dangerous Liaisons: A Domestic Violence Typology in Custody
Litigation, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 115, 159 (2017). See generally Ruth Aitken &
Vanessa E. Munro, Domestic Abuse and Suicide Report 2018, REFUGE PUBL’NS
(2018), https://www.refuge.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Domestic-Abuseand-Suicide.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6CJ-WGRU]; Torna Pitman, Living with Coercive Control: Trapped Within a Complex Web of Double Standards, Double Binds
and Boundary Violations, 47 BRITISH J. SOC. WORK 143 (2016); Laura E. Watkins
et al., The Longitudinal Impact of Intimate Partner Aggression and Relationship
Status on Women’s Physical Health and Depression Symptoms, 28 J. FAM. PSYCH.
655 (2014); MICHAEL P. JOHNSON, A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTIMATE
TERRORISM, VIOLENT RESISTANCE, AND SITUATIONAL COUPLE VIOLENCE (2008);
STARK, supra note 220, at 83–170; Deborah Loxton et al., Psychological Health in
Midlife Among Women Who Have Ever Lived with a Violent Partner or Spouse, 21
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1092 (2006); Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman,
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turn, is relevant to a defender’s good-faith, subjective fear of imminent
injury or death. It, moreover, appreciates the objective reality of domestic violence (in terms of patterns of violence, degree, and triggers)
and the related reasonableness of the response.224
As relevant here, and as detailed above, the value-based model’s
concern is with protecting the equal standing (value #3) and private
domain (value #4) of both defenders and attackers. It, therefore, permits force to be used to the extent that it is immediately necessary to
block or fend off an unjust threat.225 By endorsing such a relatively
broad formulation of what otherwise is the imminence requirement,
the value-based model accords battered intimate partners with a comparatively greater ability to lawfully protect themselves—and, more
to the point, with the opportunity to persuade courts and juries that
their conduct was, under the circumstances, justified self-defense.
B.

Special Rules for “Attacks” on the Police?

Few topics have in recent years generated as much passionate debate as the use of force by (and against) the police. Police officers by
dint of their vocation frequently (and, critics would contend, too frequently) find themselves in situations where they believe they must
use force to subdue and arrest individuals with whom they come into
contact. Accordingly, they tend to receive special training in dealing
with noncompliant, violent individuals who pose a threat to them
(though the quality and extent of that training—and the relative lack
of emphasis placed on de-escalation techniques—are very much subjects of ongoing debate).226 Yet despite this training, instances of alleged (and, in contemporary times, recorded) excessive force have
become a regular fixture of the evening news in the U.S. and elsewhere.227 Determining the legitimate extent of police violence in selfdefense against attackers has, therefore, never been more topical.228

224.

225.
226.
227.

228.

Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX
ROLES 743, 747 (2005).
See also BLINDER, supra note 217, at § 8:15 (analyzing battered woman syndrome
and case examples); Jonathan Herring, The Severity of Domestic Abuse, 30 NAT’L
L. SCH. INDIA REV. 37, 40–43 (2018) (defining coercive control and its relation to
domestic abuse cases). See generally Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics:
The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family Violence Directed Toward
Women and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. STATE U. L. REV. 111, 163–64
(2000); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 996–1026 (1995).
See supra Part IV.
See generally Erb, supra note 166, at sidenote 187; FUNK, supra note 4, at 132–33.
See generally Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: DeEscalation, Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV.
629, 629–35.
See DSOUZA, supra note 37, at 169–72.
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Because the value-based model recognizes the paradox of mutual
justification, if an officer’s exercise of defensive force is justified, then
a citizen will not receive the justification of self-defense if she counters
the officer with force.229 On the issue of retreat, for policy-based reasons there is broad agreement in the U.S. that officers, as a general
rule, are not legally obligated to retreat when facing potential aggression.230 That said, basic prudence and common de-escalation methodologies teach that strategic retreat from a volatile or otherwise
escalating situation is frequently the officer’s best and most professional response.
Turning to the reasonableness of the officer’s belief (often the outcome-determinative question), the problem with the common “reasonable belief” standard in the police context is that the term is openended (or, as Baker puts it, a “woolly word”231). It is often equated
with “typicality” (that is, it is measured against the beliefs of the typical officer). Article 2(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights,
for its part, rather reasonably dictates that self-defense is unavailable
in cases where the officer was laboring under an objectively unreasonably mistaken belief because such force is not “absolutely
necessary.”232
Consistent with the value-based model’s emphasis on value #1 (collective violence reduction), value #2 (protection of the individual at229. Because external justification is not required in England, citizens are in fact able
to act in self-defense if they honestly believe they are being attacked. See also
Rönnau & Hohn, supra note 65, at sidenotes 129–30; Erb, supra note 166, at
sidenote 192; BAKER, supra note 45, at 917, 926–31 (discussing the circumstances
in which a citizen may “use reasonable force” against the police). Because an officer’s use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon or to effectuate an arrest
does not, without more, implicate self-defense, those situations will not be discussed here.
230. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (2)(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2019); Boykin v. People, 45 P.
419, 421 (Colo. 1896); Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197,
1234 (2016); BOAZ SANGERO, SELF-DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW 202–03 (2006); Gail
Rodwan, Criminal Law, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 503, 538 (1993).
231. BAKER, supra note 45, at 919.
232. See generally Bubbins v. United Kingdom, App. No. 50196/99 (March 17, 2005),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68548 [https://perma.cc/8VUJ-NJK3]; McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91 (Sept. 27, 1995), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57943 [https://perma.cc/YUP8-6BPH]; Stewart v.
United Kingdom [1984] 7 E.H.R.R. 453; Guide on Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. 22–23 (last updated Dec. 31,
2020), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_2_ENG.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N5RR-6WSG]; IAN PARK, THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARMED CONFLICT 36–41
(2018). This objective test appears to conflict with the subjective “genuine belief”
standard adopted in England. See HANNAH RUSSELL, THE USE OF FORCE AND ARTICLE 2 OF THE ECHR IN LIGHT OF EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 27 (2017); LEVERICK,
supra note 1, at 190. But see R. (Bennett) v. Coroner [2007] A.C.D. 2 (contending
that Article 2 and England’s reasonableness test are not incompatible and
presuming that state agents are objectively reasonable).
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tacker), and value #6 (maintenance of the legitimacy of the legal
order),233 and in line with the articulated policy reasons, law enforcement officers operating reasonably within their roles should be considered prima facie justified when using reasonable force to effectuate
arrests when the circumstances dictate that such arrests are necessary. Any use of force to “defend” against officers operating reasonably
cannot, therefore, qualify as self-defense, lest the situation fall under
the paradox of mutual justifications.234 Alternative outcomes would
make it exceedingly difficult for the police to, as a practical matter,
effectively fulfill their professional obligations.
Consistent with Lee’s position,235 traditional self-defense doctrine
applying to civilians, and the value-based model’s emphasis on the
right to life, the conclusion reached here is that the officer exercising
defensive force (1) must have reasonable beliefs and take reasonable
actions, (2) must be subjectively motivated by those reasonable beliefs,
and (3) the officer’s conduct must be immediately necessary and proportional to the threat she is facing. These requirements are comparatively stringent, but recent events have demonstrated that such
appropriate restrictions on force can no longer be pushed aside.
Retreat, on the other hand, is a difficult requirement to impose on
the police.236 That said, as part of the reasonableness evaluation, the
fact finder should be directed to consider whether the officer engaged
in any available de-escalation measures237 prior to deploying deadly
self-preferential force. This more balanced approach reasonably recognizes the attacker’s individual right to life (value #2), without inappropriately infringing on the officer’s rights (value #4 and possibly value
#3) or the state’s collective interest in preserving law and order (value
#1). The value-based model, in sum, does not follow those U.S. jurisdictions that elevate the officer over the citizen by granting her unique
protections (a) when she is acting objectively unreasonably or (b) lacks
the requisite subjective defensive will.
233. See supra sections II.A–B, F.
234. This is also referred to as the “incompatibility thesis.” See supra subsection
III.B.3; Rosenau, supra note 67, at sidenote 18; Fontaine, supra note 66, at 78–79.
235. See Lee, supra note 227, at 661–75. See also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief
Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 235–37 (1998) (proposing a self-defense provision for Congress to adopt that relies on “reasonable beliefs and reasonable acts”).
236. See supra section IV.C (discussing why retreat should not be legally required in
all cases).
237. Cf. J. Pete Blair et al., Reasonableness and Reaction Time, 14 POLICE Q. 323, 336
(2011) (noting that officer reaction time is very limited). See generally Rachel
Abanonu, De-Escalating Police-Citizen Encounters, 27 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC.
JUST. 239, 268–69 (2018); Ryan Geisser, A Just War Inquiry of Police, Prosecutors
& Deadly Force, 10 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 59, 63 (2017).

68

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:1

VII. PARTING THOUGHTS ON THE FINDINGS’
IMPLICATIONS
It is hoped that the reader who got this far, and who understands
how the value-based model approaches the historically difficult selfdefense scenarios, is persuaded that a broader consideration of the
values implicated in self-defense scenarios considerably improves the
transparency of decision-making and reduces the role of hidden
normativity. At the level of specific application, I have tried to use the
value-based model to address the central theoretical questions characterizing the self-defense debate. It is submitted that this approach allowed for the development of internally consistent, defensible answers
to these core theoretical questions. For example:
• Self-defense functions as a justification, not an excuse.
• A defender must be both internally and externally justified to
be able to claim self-defense (and reasonable mistakes of fact,
therefore, make the justification of self-defense unavailable).
• Imminence should be evaluated objectively.
• Defensive force must be immediately necessary, making selfdefense more available to battered intimate partners.
• Self-defense should be available (though in diminished form)
even against morally innocent attackers because attacks need
not be criminal.
• Objectively disproportionate force precludes self-defense.
• There should be no duty to retreat when faced with a culpable
attack and safe retreat is not an option.
• Passive conduct can constitute an attack.
• Unknowingly justified defenders should not be able to cloak
themselves in self-defense.
• Deadly force should not be available to defend property or to
ward off trivial threats.
• Though there is no strict duty to avoid conflict, individuals
must at least attempt to avoid circumstances where they know
an attack is likely.
Of course, I hasten to add the concession that the proffered answers to these core doctrinal questions are very much subject to
change as one’s normative judgments concerning the implicated values shift (indeed, this observation undergirds the very point of the
value-based model). But it is argued that the model’s adaptability
serves to confirm, rather than to invalidate, its appeal.
By framing the debate from a value-centric perspective, the analysis proceeds through an examination of whether important values
were omitted or whether the weighting of others was appropriate.
Forcing these inherently normative questions more squarely into the
public forum expands the range of perspectives represented in the de-
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bate. It also encourages more thoughtful and nuanced choices among
those perspectives. Stated differently, by shifting the focus of the analysis to values, the methodology makes transparent the types of normative judgments that in the main have been left either un- or underaddressed.
As of this writing, there is a raging debate over various aspects of
our criminal justice system—including, of course, self-defense and the
use of force by the police. Finding solutions to today’s fraught criminal
justice reform debates requires, as a starting point, a common language of values. More transparency and less hidden, undemocratic
normativity in the decision-making will serve to shore up the justice
system’s legitimacy and creditworthiness at a critical time in our history. Advancing those interests has been the central purpose of this
undertaking.
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Core Theoretical Questions

Issue
Does self-defense
function as a
justification or an
excuse?
Must circumstances
be both internally
and externally
justified to qualify as
self-defense?
Do even reasonable
mistakes of fact make
self-defense
unavailable?
Is self-defense
available against
morally innocent
“attackers”?
Can an unknowingly
justified defender
claim self-defense?
Must the attack be
criminal?
Can deadly force be
used to protect
property?
Can deadly force be
used to ward off
trivial threats?
Can passive conduct
constitute an “attack”
authorizing selfdefense?
Is imminence of the
threat objectively
evaluated?

Value-Base Model
Justification.

U.S.
Justification.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

No.

No.

No.

No.

No.

No.

No.

No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.
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Issue
What is the
relationship between
imminence and
necessity?

Value-Base Model
Defensive force must
be “immediately
necessary.”

Can a “battered
woman” rely on
anticipatory selfdefense?
Are there special
rules for “attacks” by
the police?

Yes, if force is
“immediately
necessary.”

U.S.
Imminence means
“about to occur.”
Imminence and
necessity are thus
separate concepts
(force must be
“necessary” to respond
to imminent harm).
No.

Generally, no.
Yes—prima facie
justification to
effectuate arrest. If
officers act outside of
the scope of
authorization, normal
self-defense rules
pertain.
Yes.
Yes.

Does objectively
disproportionate
defensive force
preclude a selfdefense justification?
Is there a strict duty No. But retreat may
to retreat?
be required if the
defender knows the
attack is by an
“innocent,” safe
retreat is an option, or
both.
Is there a strict duty No. But individuals
to avoid conflict?
must at least attempt
to avoid places where
they know an attack is
likely.

B.
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Generally, yes (if
outside of the home
and not in a standyour-ground state).

No, unless the
defender knows the
attack is by an
“innocent” or family
member.

Proposed Value-Based Self-Defense Jury Instruction
The defendant has offered evidence of having acted in self-defense.
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You are instructed that the use of force is justified when a person
reasonably believes that it is immediately necessary for the defense of
oneself [or another] against unlawful force. However, a person must
use no more force than what, from an objective perspective, was reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm is justified in selfdefense only if a person reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in reasonable self-defense. Put another way, in
this case the government bears the burden of disproving the defendant’s self-defense claim.
C.

Comments to the Jury Instruction

When there is evidence of self-defense, this additional element
should be added to the instruction on the substantive offense. For example, “Fourth, the defendant did not act in reasonable self-defense.”
A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when there is
any foundation in the evidence, even though the evidence may be
weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.
The jury must unanimously reject the defendant’s self-defense theory in order to find the defendant guilty.

